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ABSTRACT 
This study addresses political participation rights from the perspective of a 
social movement. We focus on the case of the NO movement which emerged 
in Costa Rica in 2007 in the run-up to the Referendum on ratification of the 
Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA). The study explores some 
ways the NO movement sought to make political participation rights real for 
voters during the Referendum campaign. The central focus is on how political 
participation rights were claimed and exercised by members of the 
movement. We consider how more democratic understandings of political 
participation emerged, during the campaign process itself from the NO 
movement’s practices. The main findings are that the NO movement’s 
understanding of political participation rights was intimately connected to how 
the movement framed its own collective actions, which were understood as a 
defence of a historically and socially-embedded Costa Rican model of 
development. This in turn arose from a certain, shared nationalist vision that 
combined liberal democracy, economic nationalism and welfarist 
redistribution. During the CAFTA Referendum process, the NO movement’s 
members sought to realize participation rights through both formal and 
informal claims and practices. On the one hand, NO movement participants 
demanded – and claimed – formal institutional accountability for the 
protection of these rights. At the same time, they relied heavily on their own 
efforts to open up and protect new spaces for collective action. The NO 
movement thus defended its own members’ and supporters’ rights to political 
participation in several ways. In our view, this process helped promote wider 
critical awareness of the prospects for active citizen involvement in public 
decision making processes in Costa Rica generally. The study suggests that 
even in the absence of effective legal regulations that can be used to protect 
people’s political rights to participate, a movement can sometimes build 
effective rights realization ‘from below’, through creating spaces for 
democratic participation of citizens. It is argued that this is often a crucial 
dimension of rights realization and that rights to political participation can be 
exercised by citizens as well as claimed from the state. One of the main 
democratic contributions of the NO movement was to help open up new 
debates what kind of state, what kind of society, and what kind of economic 
development Costa Ricans wanted. Contestations of existing power relations 
were central to the pre-Referendum debates around CAFTA. And this study 
suggests that the NO movement thus challenged neoliberal notions of 
development and democracy both through its messages and through its 
organizational practices during the Referendum campaign. Authoritarian 
exclusionary and vertical logics, as well as the principles of competence and 
commercialization, came into question in the process.  
Keywords 
CAFTA, Costa Rica, Rights, Social Movement, Political Participation 
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LIST OF ACRONYMS 
Acronyms Name Category 
ANEP Asociación Nacional de Empleados Públicos - 
(National Association of Public 
Employees) 
Trade Union 
AyA Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y 
Alcantarillados – Nacional Institute of 
Water and Sewage Service 
Public Enterprise 
CAFTA 
(TLC in 
Spanis  
Tratado de Libre Comercio - US - Central 
America – Dominican Republic Free 
Trade Agreement 
Policy 
CCSS Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social - Social 
Security Institution 
State Institution 
It provides health care 
CIAC Centro de Información y Apoyo Cantonal - 
Information and Local Support Center 
Organizational space of the 
NO campaign 
Central instance of the NO 
for coordination and 
support to local bodies 
CNL  Coordinadora Nacional de Lucha Contra el 
TLC  -National Coordinating 
Committee Against CAFTA 
Social Organization 
Network of organizations 
against CAFTA 
COMBO 
ICE 
  
Project of Modernization of the 
institution of telecommunications that 
was approved in the Parliament and 
stopped due a strong social  
mobilization in 2000 
It refers to both, a policy 
and a social mobilization 
against that policy 
COMEX
  
Ministerio de Comercio Exterior - Ministry 
of External Commerce 
Governmental Institution 
COPF  Comité Operativo Político Funcional – 
Functional Political Operative 
Committee 
Organizational space of the 
NO campaign 
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emerged in the Referendum 
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FTA Free Trade Agreement Policy 
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Rights 
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rights 
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State Institution 
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THE 2007 ‘NO-CAFTA’ MOVEMENT IN COSTA 
RICA 1 
REFLECTING ON SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND POLITICAL 
PARTICIPATION RIGHTS 
1 INTRODUCTION 
This study addresses political participation rights from the perspective of a 
social movement, the NO movement which emerged in Costa Rica in 2007 
and campaigned against ratification of the Central American Free Trade 
Agreement (CAFTA) by the government. This chapter will consider some of 
the overall issues that have inspired this choice of subject matter.  We first 
introduce the key issues and problems, followed by key objectives and research 
questions, and finally justify the qualitative approach adopted and explain how 
the sections of the paper are organized. 
1.1 The focus of this study: a movement against CAFTA 
Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) between rich and poor countries have been 
promoted in the Latin American region as the best way for achieving 
development. However such agreements are a matter of dispute as well as a 
point of convergence for social movements throughout the continent (Zibechi, 
2007: 19-22). Critics have pointed out that FTAs have implications for social, 
political and cultural life more generally (Carazo, 2007). Even some who think 
FTAs can bring about eventual improvements in macro-economic indicators 
and can benefit some people, recognize their potential negative social 
implications for the poor (Todd et al, 2004: 50). Diverse social movements, 
academics and civil organizations in Latin America have expressed concern 
about the social justice, distributional equity as well as human rights 
implications of these agreements. The negative implications for historically 
excluded and disadvantaged populations, especially poor women, children, 
elderly people, the landless and indigenous among others, have been 
highlighted by civil society groups and NGOs (Oxfam, 2007; Zeledón, 2006). 
FTAs and the neoliberal project they entail have generated significant 
levels of opposition and protest, at national, regional and global levels (Smith 
et al, 2008).  In Latin America social movements have become key actors in the 
political debate around FTAs and other forms of neoliberal economic 
globalization (Icaza Garza, 2004).  The debate has been around economic, and 
also around political and ethical implications of such agreements.  We consider 
who bears the cost and reaps the benefits of various forms of freedom and 
democracy, and on the basis of whose values and rules decisions are taken 
concerning something like CAFTA (Gasper, 2004 and De Martino, 2000 in 
Zepeda, 2006). 
                                                 
1 With thanks to Dr. Rosalba Adriana Icaza Garza for her valuable comments. 
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This study itself focuses on the experience of the ‘NO-CAFTA or anti-
CAFTA2  movement in Costa Rica during 2007. This movement is taken as an 
example of a social movement involved in the wider anti-free trade struggle in 
the Latin and Central American region. These regional movements especially 
critique the top-down ways neo-liberal policies have been imposed. Their 
demands have included more participation, more transparent information, a 
voice for poor people, and wider citizen influence in major development 
decisions. As with many other social movements in Central America and Latin 
America, the Costa Rican anti-CAFTA identified democratic political 
participation as the key component of positive social change (De Souza Santos, 
2006; Smith et al, 2008). The interaction between political participation and 
positive social change is the main focus of this study, rather than the actual 
contents of CAFTA or the outcome of the Referendum around Costa Rican 
membership of CAFTA. 
The Movimiento Patriótico NO al TLC (Patriotic NO movement 
opposed to CAFTA), or the NO movement, as we call it for short, emerged in 
the run up to October’s 2007 Referendum on CAFTA.  This movement arose 
out of existing forms of social organization, including various anti-CAFTA 
initiatives across the country. It sought to mobilize the entire Costa Rican 
electorate against CAFTA ratification, following an agreement earlier 
negotiated by the governments of Central America and the US. This study is 
based mainly on observations during the campaign, prior to the actual 
Referendum. For this reason, the study leaves out the results of the 
Referendum, and looks instead at the processes involved.  This case suggests 
that defining ‘national development’ should be an essential component of the 
basic human right to political participation. 
1.2 Key guiding questions 
This study explores how the NO-CAFTA movement tried to realize political 
participation rights in the context of the CAFTA Referendum campaign. We 
ask: How did the NO movement seek to achieve more democratic 
understandings and practices of political participation generally?  A 
second key question is this: How were more democratic understandings 
and practices of political participation imagined, acted on and promoted 
by the NO movement in the context of the Costa Rican CAFTA 
Referendum campaign?  To answer these questions, we look at how the 
NO-CAFTA movement claimed and exercised political participation rights 
during the CAFTA Referendum campaign. 
We will look a the NO movement’s claim that they were mobilising for 
political participation rights, and also we consider how NO movement 
members campaigned and mobilized for the NO vote. We consider the 
messages and forms of communicative action they used to convey the 
                                                 
2 CAFTA (TLC in Spanish): United States – Central America - Dominican Republic 
Free Trade Agreement. 
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legitimacy of their position.  Both of us are interested in processes of social 
change and in how rights are realized in practice.  It was this shared interest 
that informed the reworking of Mercedes’ original RP completed as part of her 
specialization in Human Rights, Development and Social Justice (Alvarez 
Rudín, 2008).  This research aims to reflect on a very interesting illustrative 
example of how rights to political participation can be claimed and exercised in 
practice by a social movement, even in a highly polarized context such as a 
Referendum campaign. In presenting this study, we hope to contribute to the 
debate on how political participation rights might work in practice in different 
contexts, especially where social movements are involved in trying to make 
such rights ‘real’ for voters, citizens and the general public.  
The Costa Rican case is significant for people familiar with its particular 
historical context, but it also echoes many aspects of trade politics and 
especially anti-FTA struggles elsewhere in the wider Central American and 
Latin American region. We hope scholars of social movements and rights-
promoting strategies, as well as those interested in supporting civil society 
building, will wish to reflect on and learn from this case study.  
1.3 Context and relevance of the topic 
CAFTA was the last in a long series of Free Trade Agreements between the US 
and countries of the Latin American region. An initiative of the US 
government, CAFTA was supposed to benefit Central American and 
Caribbean countries. Announced for the first time in 2001, by 2003 
negotiations had begun with Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador and 
Guatemala (with the Dominican Republic brought in later).  The agreement 
was signed in 2004.  With more than 2500 pages of ‘technical jargon and 
puzzling economic terms’, the CAFTA document was too complex for the 
general public to be able to understand it (CAFTA, 2005; Moreno, 2005 cited 
by Zepeda, 2006:7). 
By early 2007 Costa Rica was the only country not to have ratified 
CAFTA, and a Referendum was called following strong social pressure and 
public agitation against the agreement.  Social mobilization in the country had 
started as soon as CAFTA was announced, and this tended to grow with time. 
In the context of the referendum, the ‘YES’ vote was supported by the Costa 
Rican government and by corporate interests, including most of the media.  By 
contrast, the ‘NO’ vote was supported by a much more diverse coalition, 
formed by a many different organisations, including identity and interest-based 
groups and alliances as well as many individual citizens.3  The outcome of the 
                                                 
3 Among the groups of participants were trade unions (mainly from public 
institutions), academics (mainly from the public universities), artists, religious 
community-based groups and religious and clerical authorities (priests, bishops and 
pastors), environmentalists, campesinos (small peasants, agricultures), indigenous 
people, feminists and women’s groups, students, sexual diversity groups, independent 
entrepreneurs, grass-root organizations, members of different political parties, and 
also individual citizens who did not belong to any organization. 
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Referendum was eventually in favour of CAFTA. With a 40 per cent 
abstention rate, the difference between the YES and NO votes was only 3 per 
cent (see Annex No.1). Although the legitimacy of the Referendum results 
were questioned by critics from within and outside the NO movement, and by 
some international observers, the results stand (Benedicto Salmerón, 2008). 
The right to participation is founded on the principle that individuals 
should be involved in decisions that affect them. In other words, the basic 
interests and rights of all citizens, and especially of those with the least 
influence, should be protected and promoted so that policies devised reflect 
their concerns, or at the very least do no harm to those who are already most 
vulnerable (Sepúlveda, et al, 2004). However, definitions of participation rights 
within formal human rights instruments tend to be quite narrow. Political 
participation rights are more or less equated with taking part in existing 
institutional and electoral arrangements, especially with voting. The right to 
participation can be further extended, however, to include the wider processes 
by which people get involved in how political life is organized in the first place. 
Historically, social movements have challenged conventional and narrow 
notions of political participation, and of human rights in general (Stammers, 
2005). They have done so by challenging existing forms of domination and 
structures that centre on the monopoly of state authority.  Under neo-liberal 
globalization, the task of defending social justice and basic human rights often 
implies that social movements have to engage in a struggle around the meaning 
of democracy, and have to ask how wider social and economic as well as 
political structures can be democratized (Alvarez, Dagnino, & Escobar, 1998; 
Dagnino, 2005; De Souza Santos, 2006; Molyneux & Lazar, 2003; Smith et al, 
2008). By studying a concrete example of a social movement – in this case the 
NO movement in Costa Rica – this study is intended to make a contribution to 
our understanding of how political participation rights can be realized in 
practice.  
This research also responds to an interest and general need to study forms 
of collective resistance in Central America. As Zepeda (2006) has suggested, in 
his research on hegemonic discourses in the implementation of the neoliberal 
agenda in El Salvador, there is a need to explore alternatives discourses and 
forms of resistance to neoliberal policies, and more specifically to the CAFTA 
process. Following this, the specific case of the Costa Rica NO movement of 
2007 was selected as an illustrative one for a number of reasons:  
(i) Opposition to CAFTA in Costa Rica raises important questions about 
how human rights and social justice issues connect to wider processes of 
opposition and mobilization against neo-liberalism at national, regional and 
global levels;  
(ii) The Costa Rican case is among the most visible and long-lived social 
mobilization against CAFTA in the entire Central American region. It has 
involved a significant portion of the citizenry as protagonists of political 
participation rights, and it was popular agitation that led to agreement to hold a 
Referendum in the first place, with the resulting campaign.   
(iii) The NO movement opposed mainstream government policies. What 
was defended as ‘normal’ development by the government was seen by NO 
movement supporters as neo-colonial manipulation by elites in close alliance 
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with the US government, corporate and media interests.  It became clear 
during the Referendum that the NO vote was a vote against the hegemonic 
position of state and capital combined. Exercising their right to political 
participation, citizens broadly campaigned for a NO vote. And since the NO 
campaign (or movement) had far fewer resources than the YES campaign, the 
very close result eventually was a remarkable achievement (assuming the results 
were fair).   
(iv) Costa Rica’s historical development model has been based on 
principles of social solidarity rather than out and out competitive market 
capitalism. The social system in the country has been glued together by social 
justice in the form of redistributional policies and public services. Many basic 
economic and social rights were secured for most of the population during the 
post-war period up to the 1990s. There was relative social and political stability. 
The NO movement saw itself as defending this model in contrast with wider 
trends in Central America, and is worth examining also for this reason.  
Looking more closely at the NO Movement, and at how those in the 
movement have claimed and exercised their political participation rights, may 
also help us to ask how democratic and rights-protecting the Costa Rican social 
and governmental system really has been. 
1.4 Methodology: a qualitative approach 
This study is based on a Research Paper, completed in 2008, and largely based 
on qualitative fieldwork carried out in by Alvarez Rudin (2008) in Costa Rica in 
the summer of 2007. In developing the RP analysis further, we were interested 
to explore the meanings and processes that emerged from the NO movement, 
treating it as a social movement that enabled its members to both claim and 
exercise their rights to political participation (Laws, Harper, & Marcus, 2003: 27-
29). A broadly social constructionist approach has been adopted, so that 
knowledge is viewed as both inhabited and influenced by the views of the 
researchers. “Today, knowledge and political action have become inseparable”, 
as Susan George puts it (2004: 187). We do not think an objective study is 
possible, but rather reflect on how the research questions and methodology of 
the paper reflect a particular subjectivity (Laws et al, 2003:78-82).  We have 
benefitted from contrasting our views with theory, and getting valuable 
feedback from colleagues, researchers and those who have shared their views 
during interviews. 
Fieldwork was undertaken during the highly polarized CAFTA campaign 
in the run-up to the October 2007 Referendum.  As Alvarez Rudín conducted 
interviews (Annex 2), she made notes, then recording and transcribing what 
was said. Participant observation and informal conversations provided 
additional important insights for the original research paper, further elaborated 
on in this working paper. Radio programs were a significant source of 
campaigning information (Annex 3), and campaign materials were also 
obtained from physical and electronic sources, including the ‘official’ web 
pages of the NO movement and related e-mail lists. Electronic messages 
received through email lists revealed something of the daily dynamics involved 
in how the NO movement was claiming and exercising rights to political 
participation during the campaign. Formal legal documentation was useful in 
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understanding the wider context of the NO movement’s mobilizing and 
campaigning work.  Scholarly literature on CAFTA, on Costa Rica and on 
social movements and how participation rights are claimed and exercised was 
important for theoretical inspiration. 
The challenge was how to study something – both a campaign and a 
movement – that was on-going.  Reflecting on the significance of statements 
made was difficult when events were taking place as the research was being 
conducted. Since the NO movement was both dispersed and decentralized, a 
substantial part of fieldwork had to be devoted to mapping out what was 
happening during the campaign. Formal interviews were possible with 
representatives of most key groups in the NO movement, but not all.  YES 
supporters or organizers were not interviewed, and the research has therefore 
relied on members of the NO movement for its information.  Informal 
observation was also conducted in people’s daily life spaces: in buses, family 
meetings, and in gatherings of acquaintances at home or outside. In these 
spaces, vocal political debates would arise around CAFTA issues.  Informal 
conversation for and against CAFTA thus complemented formal fieldwork.   
To study a process in motion, prior to the Referendum results, was 
challenging and required a ‘dual’ vantage point, with the researcher being 
positioned both inside and outside the movement. This could be emotionally 
draining. Repeatedly stepping back to consider the movement’s ‘movement’, to 
observe it from a distance, was difficult to combine with being involved at the 
same time.  The immediacy of the original research proved to be an advantage, 
however, as we later reflected on the confusing and messy process, which 
turned into something that started to make sense. Well-grounded analytical 
tools were applied to the material collected, to campaign materials and to how 
the NO campaign was organised. Close range study produced deeper and more 
substantial insights into the complexity of the movement, and was fruitful in 
ways that a more hands-off approach might not have been.  The main concern 
has been to reflect on how NO movement members have acted to promote 
their own individual and collective rights to political participation.  We also 
consider what this might mean for democratic political participation rights in 
Costa Rica more generally.    
1.5 Outline of sections 2-7 
Having outlined the main research concerns and questions, and the wider 
regional context in which the NO movement in Costa Rica emerged, Section 2 
will introduce some key concepts, and background information and contextual 
elements will then be presented in Section 3. Section 4 focuses on NO 
movement claims for political participation rights during the campaign, whilst 
Section 5 considers in more detail how the NO movement was able to exercise 
rights to political participation in practice.  This substantial section reflects on 
shared meanings built into the emerging social spaces of the NO movement, 
considering some of the main actors involved. In Section 6 we return to the 
central questions, and present a brief analytical synthesis in light of the study’s 
main findings. A short conclusion relates the NO movement back to the wider 
Latin American regional context, and to other right-based social movements. 
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2 ADDRESSING SOME BASIC QUESTIONS 
Some basic questions explored here are:  How can political participation be 
understood, in general, and in the case of the NO movement in Costa 
Rica in particular? What are political participation rights more generally, 
and in this context?  What is a social movement and how does such a 
movement relate to citizenship, agency and rights, in general and in the 
Costa Rican case? What significance do these terms have for broader 
democratic outcomes for Costa Rican citizens? The NO movement seems 
to be characterized by claims typical of such movements: claims for 
autonomous identities; claims to portray alternative world-visions and values; 
claims to an actor-oriented politics protective of rights – including of 
participation rights. These themes are explored in this section.  
2.1 How can Political Participation, Citizenship and Agency 
be understood? 
Dominant liberal and neoliberal perspectives see democracy as mostly about 
taking part in elections, and political participation mainly about choosing 
between political parties or candidates. From this point of view, citizens’ 
political actions take place in established, formal institutional arenas, at clearly 
specified points in time.  Political participation is understood as a functional 
and integrative process, in which politicians are elected and officials are 
appointed so that most people do not need, indeed cannot, be protagonists in 
daily, on-going political decision-making.  These restrictive rules and this 
narrow meaning of ‘democracy’, and the related notion of ‘the public’, are both 
widely contested by social movements.  In Costa Rica, as elsewhere, social 
movements seek to redefine, broaden and deepen shared understandings of 
what ‘democratic’ politics looks like.  Like other social justice movements, the 
NO movement tended to redefine democracy more broadly to include citizen 
involvement in institutional systems and participatory processes. Participation 
was to promote economic and social as well as political rights. Democracy in 
this wider sense, should challenge existing patterns of inequality and 
oppression4 through more direct forms of political participation (Alvarez, 
Dagnino, & Escobar, 1998a; Dagnino, 1998; Olesen, 2005). 
We understand political ‘participation’ in this broader sense, as a set of 
processes through which people are actively – rather than passively - involved 
in shaping ‘…the decisions and events that shape their lives’ (Cornwall & 
Gaventa, 2001; Gaventa, 2002; UNDP, 2000:38).  In the liberal ideal, the 
judiciary, the executive and the legislature of the modern democratic state 
operate in ‘balance’ in the established architecture. A more realistic view is that 
such formal institutional principles combine with the ‘non-formal actors and 
processes [that]…occur outside formal institutions and may be equally, or even 
                                                 
4 Some social movements also ‘aim to protect privilege… discrimination, intolerance 
and injustice’.  Here the interest is for those ‘progressive’ movements informed by 
concerns of social justice and rights (Hickey & Mohan, 2005:248). 
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more important, in influencing outcomes’ (Thiele, 1997 in Ramírez Ballivian, 
2007: 24). All those: ‘…actions that take place in the public sphere… with the 
aim of changing power relations through formal or informal channels […] and 
by any individual or group who decides to do so’ (ibid) are included in a wider 
definition of political participation.  As part and parcel of political life, informal 
transformational actions help determine how democratic or undemocratic the 
outcomes of political processes will be.   
Feminists have redefined political participation in similarly broad terms, to 
include transformations that cut across the ‘public’ and ‘personal’, or ‘private’ 
spheres. Unlike in liberal theory, feminists do not see these are ‘naturally’ 
distinct and separate areas of life.  The point for feminist analysis is that 
private-public distinctions, rather like formal-informal divisions, are socially 
and politically constructed.  What falls in the private or public sphere is defined 
legally and economically, but also culturally and conventionally.  Dominant 
power relations are likely to be critical, and feminists therefore extend the 
definition of the public to include many issues that are defined as ‘personal’ or 
‘private’ by liberal democratic theory.  From a feminist standpoint, private 
issues can become subject to public democratic debate and action, when their 
assignment to the private sphere is contested (Lister, 1997 in Hickey & Mohan, 
2005:254).   
This insight is helpful to this study, since contested and extended notions 
of what is ‘public’ and ‘private’ have been central to political debates around 
CAFTA. What citizens can and cannot do in public is part of the agenda of 
liberalization that the NO movement sought to contest.  Making public a set of 
private concerns, debates and practices around CAFTA was important, and 
resonated with similar contestatory social movements mobilised against 
CAFTA elsewhere, which have similarly opposed a simplistic relegation of 
gender-related issues to the private sphere, as biased.  
Participation – like democracy - is another contentious social science 
concept, in spite of its frequent use as a technocratic tool, which tends to 
reinforce rather than challenge oppressive socio-economic structures and 
unjust social relations (Cooke & Kothari, 2001; Cornwall & Gaventa, 2001; 
Dagnino, 2005).  Like democratic politics, participatory politics can be 
narrowly confined to a set of choices within pre-existing sets of possibilities, 
already decided on by policy makers.  This implies that political participation is 
functional to ‘system stability’ rather political citizenship rights. Wider 
definitions of political participation see it as being able to generate new, more 
creative forms of democratic and rights-based political practices. These may 
even challenge overall ‘system stability’, undermining the status quo.  During 
the Referendum process, a narrow definition of political participation was 
largely adopted. The aim of the Referendum for the YES campaign, for 
instance, was to publicly legitimize existing political and economic projects 
rather than challenge their premises. If participation and democracy are 
narrowly defined, however, the rights and interests of the majority of citizens, 
including the most vulnerable and disadvantaged, may not be protected at all.  
Democratic participation may only serve to perpetuate unjust and unequal 
outcomes, and thus keep the system ‘orderly’. 
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Critics of narrow notions of democratic political participation object that 
people need to be able to question existing political processes for a genuine 
democratization of politics.  Hickey and Mohan, for example, note that for 
participation to be transformative in a democratic sense, it needs: 1) to engage 
with ‘issues of power and politics’, 2) to pursue ‘participation as citizenship’ 
and 3) to have a ‘close engagement with underlying processes of development, 
rather than remain constrained within the frame of specific policy processes or 
interventions’ (Hickey & Mohan, 2005: 247).  From this perspective, social 
movements can play a special role in bringing about more radical democratic 
change, by acting: ‘as sites of popular participation and political projects’ 
(Hickey & Mohan, 2005:248-51).  
More transformative notions of political participation have emerged from 
a number of Latin American social movements, which have redefined 
participation as rooted in active ‘citizenship’. By locating political participation 
in a radical project of democratic development, such movements redefine 
citizenship as ‘the right to have rights’ (Dagnino, 2005). Citizenship becomes 
more than a legal category, and is a process involving poor and excluded 
people actively engaging in claiming and realising their own political and other 
basic rights (Dagnino, 2005; Gaventa, 2002; Hickey & Mohan, 2005). 
Citizenship is reconceived as ongoing, as a process, implying that democracy 
too is a work in progress. Neither can therefore be taken for granted. In this 
sense: 
  …‘citizenship’ constitutes not only a set of legal obligations and entitlements, 
but also the practices through which individuals and groups formulate and claim 
new rights or struggle to expand and maintain existing rights (Hickey & Mohan, 
2005: 254).   
Genuinely democratic political participation can generate creativity in problem-
solving. The vital quality of more deeply democratic political systems should be 
that they are: ‘…capable of influencing the transformation of our societies, of 
incorporating diversity and [have] a capacity for change and using this capacity 
to produce creative responses. Inclusion and creativity should…be two 
central factors’ (emphasis in original, Subirats, n.d.: 7).  The powerful cultural 
and sentimental dimensions to participation and related rights are also 
recognised by such an approach (Alvarez, Dagnino, Escobar, & eds, 1998a; 
Dagnino, 2005; Escobar, 1992; Icaza Garza, 2004; Olesen, 2002, 2005).  
Political actors in social movements are, from this perspective, cultural 
agents who struggle both for improved material conditions and for other, less 
instrumental ends. They produce, reproduce and challenge dominant,  
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hegemonic5 representations of social reality and social relations and ultimately 
of themselves and their individual and collective actions as citizens. Active 
citizenship of this kind involves people in efforts to democratize society 
culturally, economically and socially as well as politically. When historically 
marginalized groups seek recognition that their interests, needs and views on 
life are valid and valuable, democratic citizenship can be seen as extending 
policy and power into new spheres. By enabling members to claim and exercise 
rights, including the right to full political participation, social movements aim 
to influence both formal institutions and the perceptions and feelings of those 
who participate in such movements (Kabeer, 2005; MacDonald, 2006).  The 
significance of this insight will become clearer when the NO movement is 
considered in more detail in Sections 4 and 5.  It is important to note that in 
the study of contemporary social movements, the tidy: ‘…distinction between 
‘identity’ and “interest” movements dissolves’ (Tilly, 2004: 71).  
Although overcoming cultural marginalization of the perspectives and 
viewpoints of historically excluded social groups is a challenge, their exclusion 
is never absolute.  There are always those who reinterpret and resist dominant 
visions and who – within limits – contribute nuanced or contrasting positions 
that can help transform the social landscape.  Active political participation of 
citizens needs a material as well as a value base, and supportive socio-economic 
and democratic political environments help participation in this broader sense 
to flourish. Once basic necessities are met, more time and energy may be spent 
on creating real opportunities for participation in public political life, even for 
the poorest members of society.  Unless they are violently repressed, even 
stigmatized groups may find themselves able to claim and exercise some basic 
citizenship rights and to engage in public debates and actions to challenge 
hegemonic understandings of reality, and thus seek to influence policy.  
2.2 What are Political Participation Rights? 
Conventional liberal notion of political participation are enshrined in many 
important human rights documents, including the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (1948), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), the 
American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man (1948) and the American 
Convention of Human Rights (1969). All explicitly refer to the right to vote, to 
stand for elections, to freely associate and to assemble, as well as to freedom of 
thought, religion and expression.   
                                                 
 
5 Hegemonic or dominant representations and discourses are understood here as 
interpretations of the reality that serve to maintain socioeconomic and political 
structures of domination in place.  They are produced and reproduced by different 
institutions and assumed by people as a sort of ‘common sense’.  Alternative or 
counter-hegemonic cultures and discourses challenge hegemony and portray different 
ways of being and thinking. These notions are based on Gramsci and some authors 
inspired by them (Icaza Garza, 2004). 
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The freedom of modern peoples implies the recognition of fundamental political 
rights, with political participation understood as one more political freedom, 
manifested in the rights of free expression, assembly, and organization to 
influence a country’s politics…(Subirats, n.d.: 211).  
These components of the liberal definition of political participation rights do 
not exhaust its scope and meaning, however (Sepúlveda et al, 2004:299). The 
right to access (meaningful) information, for example, can be considered 
integral and prior to the right of freedom of expression. This in turn can be 
viewed as a pre-condition for informed political participation, even from a 
narrow definitional point of view. Only for well-informed voters can their vote 
be considered an expression of their political will. 
The non-binding Declaration on the Right to Development (1986) defines 
political participation in broader terms. This Declaration specifies that 
development policy ‘aims at the constant improvement of the well-being of the 
entire population…on the basis of their active, free and meaningful 
participation… and in the fair distribution of benefits’ (Article 2). In the same 
vein, the Declaration on the rights and responsibility of individuals, groups and organs of 
society to promote and protect universally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms 
(1998) states, in Article 18, that: ‘individuals, groups, institutions and non-
governmental organizations also have an important role to play and a 
responsibility in safeguarding democracy, promoting human rights and 
fundamental freedoms and contributing to the promotion and advancement of 
democratic societies, institutions and processes’ (Van Banning, et al, 2004: 99-
102). These instruments portray duties in the process of realizing human rights 
as adhering not only to states and government institutions, but also to civil 
society and non-state actors, including individuals and NGOs.  
Given these wider notions of political participation, social movements and 
their members can be viewed as both right-holders and duty-bearers in terms 
of rights promotion, protection and fulfilment. Broader interpretation of 
participation also tie political participation rights to other forms of rights 
claims. The political participation of active citizens can be part and parcel of 
achieving more economic and social justice through promoting specific 
citizens’ rights. These can include rights to education, health, shelter and other 
rights basic to human well-being (Sepúlveda et al, 2004:299).   
Integral to political participation rights are many of the basic freedoms 
recognised in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. These include 
freedom of expression, freedom of the press, the right to communicate and the 
right to know. All are integral to political participation rights (Fisher & Harms, 
1983). So too is the right to be heard (Pereira, Romano & Antunes, 2005; 
Sepúlveda et al, 2004). The next sub-section considers voice and knowledge as 
key elements influencing how decisions are made in the public sphere. 
2.3 How can we define social movements? 
From a review of relevant literature, we found it useful to interpret a social 
movement as an on-going process of collective action, whether organised 
locally, transnationally, regionally, nationally or all of these. Movements 
normally include mostly informal as well as some formal organizations, 
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comprising groups and individuals that engage in collective action aimed at 
achieving positive social change (however defined).  
This broad definition stresses the composite nature of the organizations, 
groups and individuals that make up social movements, often in loose alliances 
and networks.  Those involved in social movements can be expected to share 
some – but not all - interests, values, aspirations and goals (De Souza Santos, 
2005; Heywood, 2002; Kaldor, 2003; Olesen, 2002). As agents of social change, 
movement actors engage in complex processes of social organization, 
involving both collaboration and competition, and also specialization.  
Personal as well as collective and policy-level change will be combined, in most 
cases, and relations between and within social movements are almost 
unavoidably complex and contradictory (De Souza Santos, 2006; Smith et al, 
2008).  Most social movements challenge dominant discourses and practices, 
and many also challenge conventional notions of an ‘organization’.  
Movements can, for instance, remain coherent in spite of complex shifts and 
alliances among sometimes symbiotic, sometimes competing groups and 
individuals.  Social movements may also reproduce within themselves the 
divide-and-rule logic of the hegemonic social order. 
Some authors distinguish old and new social movements. Classical social 
movements, said to be based on class and national identifications, include anti-
colonial and civil rights movements, and the labour movement, for example.  
‘New’ social movements are seen as emerging from the 1960s or so, when 
cross-cutting single-issues emerged in relation to ‘lifestyle’ related identity 
issues, including sexuality, race, the environment, indigenous rights, peace and 
ethnicity.  However, transnational, or global social justice movements (of 
which the NO movement in Costa Rica is both an example and a part) have 
emerged within the past few decades around opposition to the neo-liberal form 
of economic globalization, and have extended beyond any single issue frames 
of reference.  In some ways, global justice movements like these may have 
more in common with ‘older’, national and anti-colonial social movements. On 
the other hand, ‘new’ social movements have some characteristics that are also 
widely found in movements like the anti-CAFTA movement in Costa Rica:   
- Such movements mobilize around diverse issues, including for example 
human rights, gender, environment and peace;  
- Such movements can articulate and combine the interests of a wide 
diversity of actors around new demands and new forms of social 
identities;  
- There is often substantial middle class participation in such movements, 
with strong representation from highly educated and young people;   
- Such movements are typically more horizontal, more loosely organized 
and more informal than old social movements. Decentralized and more 
participatory forms of decision making are needed and also desired;  
- There is significant use of ICT (information & communication 
technology) in such movements, especially horizontal communication;  
- Various non-party political spaces are opened up for popular participation 
through such new social movements;  
- Principles of social justice and solidarity, rather than competition, 
commodification and winners and losers are typical of such movements;  
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- And finally, their actions tend to be articulated at all levels simultaneously 
(i.e. local, national, global) (De Souza Santos, 2005, 2006; Heywood, 2002; 
Hintjens, 2006a, 2006b; Icaza Garza, 2004; Kaldor, 2003; Olesen, 2002; 
Smith et al, 2008). 
There are some continuities between old and new social movements – 
including their focus on mobilizing resources to take advantage of contextual 
opportunities; their strategizing of support across regional and international 
boundaries, and their almost unavoidable ‘branding’ in order to gain 
international moral and financial support (Bob, 2005). Some theories of social 
movements emphasise the collective rationality and self interest of members 
and leaders, including in the ‘South’ (Tilly, 2004; Bob, 2005). Criticism of such 
‘rational choice’ approaches comes mainly from constructionist and cultural 
theory approaches, which stress how material and non-material concerns come 
together for participants in social movements.  Collective identities are formed 
hand in hand with shared understandings of social problems, and social 
networks are based both on solidarity and on shared ideals (e.g. social justice). 
We agree with Olesen and Tilly that significant points of convergence 
exist between ‘old’ and ‘new’ social movements and approaches (Olesen, 2002; 
Tilly, 2004).  Common understandings and identities are built around 
contextual opportunities and in relation to a concrete set of organizational 
practices, and culture and world-visions are produced through on-going (and 
irresolvable) engagements with material conditions under which such social 
movements operate.  Identities and interests-based agendas come together in 
how social movements – including the NO movement – operate in practice. 
This synthetic approach works better in analysing the NO movement than 
counter-posing material and non-material forms of logic (Tilly, 2004: 71). 
Social movement values are also organized in constant, on-going and 
dialectic social interactions with the state, with NGOs, trade unions and other 
formal institutions, meaning that “grand laws” governing or predicting social 
movements’ actions are hard to find (Tilly, 2004: 9). Stammers (2004; 
2005:322) and others have stressed the long and deep historical and causal 
links between social movements and how rights are claimed. The NO 
movement in Costa Rica is an example of this, and arose from a historically-
rooted set of material and moral claims, which in turn have influenced how the 
movement evolved both during and after the Referendum of 2007. The result 
has been that the NO movement has redefined some complex notions of 
shared interests that span national identity and the national interest, economic 
goals and fears, and has also brought in ideas and feelings about how 
democracy should work in Costa Rica. This complex mix of claims and 
practices are the focus of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of this working paper.   
In line with Olesen (2002, 2005), it also seems to us that globalization has 
spread both neo-liberal and liberal democracy discourses, including human 
rights concerns, unevenly at different levels, but always simultaneously. Neo-
liberal discourses have been critical in framing how transnational solidarity 
networks view themselves, in why they stress rights and social justice, and in 
how these are placed firmly in a broader context of the ideal of broad, more 
inclusive notions of political participation, citizenship and democracy. Finally, 
ICT helps to organize collective actions, and facilitates the construction of 
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‘common understandings of social injustice’ through facilitating an emerging 
‘common consciousness’ among distant actors (Olesen, 2005: 31). 
Movements opposed to mainstream neoliberal globalization tend to work 
at local, national and global levels simultaneously, just as neo-liberal 
globalization does. Their rights claims are usefully framed in ways that spill 
over national boundaries, challenging neoliberal practices (MacDonald, 2006).  
The values and ideas that underpin neo-liberal globalization can be used by 
social movements to repudiate economically and politically dominant 
transnational governing and business classes. Oppressive structures of class, 
gender, social identity and age inequality can be challenged simultaneously in 
complex combinations by such movements. By being able to incorporate a 
diversity of actors, interests and identities under a single, broad umbrella, social 
movements struggle for changes in practice to achieve recognition, greater 
equality, inclusion, social and environmental justice, peace, national or cultural 
identity, and human rights, including the right to participation. In many global 
social movements, such wider value claims motivate members’ simultaneous 
pursuit of interest- and identity-based claims (De Souza Santos, 2006; Hintjens, 
2006b; Icaza Garza, 2004; Smith et al, 2008). 
2.4 How do we connect Rights and Social Movements? 
Traditional approaches to human rights tend to focus on legal and formal 
aspects of human rights, and can be contrasted with an approach that 
understands rights as going beyond legally defined rights as such.  Rights in 
this sense can be realized in different ways: through coalitions of state and 
non-state actors, including social movements, NGOs and individual citizens, as 
well as through law and policy.  This is why in-depth understanding of the 
specific historic, social and cultural contexts in which rights are framed, 
claimed and eventually realized in practice, is absolutely central to any rights-
based approach (Ball, 2005; Gready, 2004).  The various actors involved in 
efforts to realize rights draw on previous experience –  whether legal, social, 
economic and/or institutional – and use this ‘social knowledge’ as well as their 
technical knowledge, to promote rights. Such efforts may not always achieve 
something positive.  Whilst intentions and strategies may be good, actual 
sustainable progress in terms of rights may be minimal or elusive. 
Claiming rights requires knowledge that includes and goes beyond legal 
knowledge. Rights claiming thus becomes a matter of strategy, a process 
embedded in wider social dynamics, involving unavoidably political, imaginary 
and value-oriented processes of citizen engagement (Dagnino, 2005; Molyneux 
& Lazar, 2003; Pereira et al, 2005; Stammers, 2004, 2005; UNDP, 2000). In 
other words, there will be ‘inductive’ as well as ‘deductive’ elements in any 
rights-based strategy for social change (de Gaay Fortman, 2006: 43-45). When 
rights are conceived in this way, they become ‘performative’; they are never 
‘obtained’ but have constantly to be struggled for (ibid.).  Rights-claiming 
processes (like citizenship) thus come to be seen as: ‘a work in progress that is 
forged and refined through social struggles’, rather than something to be 
‘achieved’ (Miller et al, 2005:33). Whilst policies and laws are usually the result 
of authority being exercised, the “living law” and socially-rooted rights claims 
are usually part of what one author calls ‘anti-power’ (de Gaay Fortman, 2006: 
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42).  Analyzing the root causes of rights violations is an indispensible first step 
in the process of identify solutions, for example by giving responsibility back 
to the appropriate institutions and actors for sorting out rights problems.  
Claiming rights thus involves people working through existing power relations 
to identify where the best chances lie for challenging the structures and 
processes that reproduce injustice and social exclusion (Pettit & Wheeler, 
2005:1). Rights claims in general are both the product of existing possibilities 
and the origin of future changes, as imagined by those claiming rights today.  
Our understanding of human rights thus recognizes that rights claims are 
often partial, and are usually built up gradually, sometimes haphazardly, and 
generally reactively “from below”, as well as “from above”.  The importance of 
formal rights enshrined in law cannot be over-stated.  But informal dimensions 
of rights are also important, especially what people understand by a ‘right’ in 
the first place. This study adopts a broadly actor-oriented approach to rights 
claims and realization (Leeuwis, Long et al., 1990). The NO movement is 
viewed as an example of how: ‘rights are shaped through actual struggles 
informed by people’s own understandings of to what they are justly entitled… 
looking at the meaning of rights from the perspective of those claiming them’ 
(Nyamu-Musembi, 2005:41).  
An agency-based approach to realizing rights emphasises that citizens have 
both rights, including political participation rights, and duties, which entail civic 
‘responsibilities’ to engage with political processes that impact on social and 
economic life. When people engage in social movements, the hope is that they 
are better able to act as: ‘agents through their own movements, promoting 
their own development’ (Hintjens, 2006a: 374). Demanding public and 
corporate accountability is one way of participating politically; accountability is 
another core element of any rights-based approach. In Costa Rica, this research 
that social movements combine notions of rights and social action in ways that 
can lead to ‘opening up political culture’ more generally.  Processes of 
participation, involving people’s active engagement in claiming rights, can 
come to be an ‘accepted and expected part of decision-making within societies’ 
(Rand & Watson, 2007:35-36). This implies that deeper democratization of 
social structures can be a possible outcome of political participation. 
2.5 Claiming and Exercising Rights 
As we have suggested, the process of realizing rights – of making rights real for 
people – is a dialectic historical, political and cultural process. It first of all 
involves broad, popularly held notions of entitlements and duties. These may 
be formally recognized through legal human rights instruments and 
procedures, or may be more informal.  Social struggles usually seek to realise a 
set of rights, incrementally, if not predictably, in specific historical 
circumstances. Under international law, states have the duty to respect and 
protect human rights, and to prevent human rights violations. States need to 
take positive actions to ensure that rights are realized (fulfilled) in practice. This 
includes introducing legislation and policies to ensure that rights are met and 
not violated. International human rights law experts have mainly insisted that 
the state remains primarily responsible for respecting, protecting and fulfilling 
basic human rights.  However, the human rights obligations of other actors, 
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including corporations, NGOs and individuals, have started to be recognized 
(International Council on Human Rights Policy, 2003; Nowak, 2005). 
As we discuss in more depth in Section 5, political participation rights – 
like many other rights – need to be exercised to become real. People within a 
social movement like the NO movement can perform some rights for 
themselves, though usually within tight limits. Rights claims are always made in 
relation to specific contexts and issues, and given that the world consists of 
structures that operate unjustly, there will always be a struggle over rights. This 
means that: ‘rights-holders always have to claim what they are due’, and that 
realizing rights requires: ‘action on the part of those who hold them’ (de Gaay 
Fortman, 2006: 37). Social actors, like those in the NO movement in Costa 
Rica, as active citizens and duty-bearers, can start, through collective action, to 
build spaces where their practices make certain rights real.   
In conclusion, this section has explored how rights realization is framed, 
how social movements are understood, and how these can be combined.  
Citizenship is part of the connection, especially if it is conceived as an active 
process of engagement with issues of social justice and basic economic and 
social rights.  Political participation rights are central, and have been defined 
broadly so that they are connected with economic and social rights and 
participation. Subjective, ethical and national norms will all influence how 
groups and individuals formally and informally give a shape to rights claims.  
All of them appeal to institutional mechanisms and procedures that apply, 
holding who they can accountable for rights-related obligations, and exercising 
rights when they are able.  
3 THE COSTA RICAN CONTEXT 
This section considers the specifically Costa Rican model of development and 
how it was challenged by ‘structural adjustment’ and liberalization of the 
economy well before the debate over CAFTA emerged. Over a period of some 
two decades, the Costa Rican ‘social contract’ between citizens and the state 
has been reorganized through withdrawal of many forms of social and 
economic protection previously provided by the state. Withdrawal of public 
action may thus have exposed the shaky basis on which the social contract was 
built in the first place, weakening constitutional economic and social rights 
guarantees under the overarching liberal democratic political order. 
3.1 The CAFTA Referendum 
Trade agreements were signed with the US throughout Central America, prior 
to the 2007 CAFTA Referendum in Costa Rica, which became the last country 
in the region to decide on CAFTA.  Costa Rican voters had already expressed 
serious doubts through protests and mass actions in earlier years.  Those in 
favour of CAFTA pointed to its potential benefits, but even they recognized 
that post-CAFTA: ‘…adjustments…will take time and will not occur without 
some losses’ (Todd, Winters & Arias, 2004: 50).  Central American 
governments would need to: ‘be prepared to respond with some form of 
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assistance to those who suffer from welfare losses as a result of the transition 
to CAFTA’ (Todd, Winters & Arias, 2004: 50). According to the same study: 
Those most at risk directly after the agreement’s implementation will be small-
scale farmers producing imported commodities and other poor rural households. 
They will need transition assistance that includes income support and/or 
technical support to be able to make the necessary transitions to the further 
opening of the area’s economy (ibid). 
In Costa Rica, CAFTA had been negotiated and signed during Abel Pacheco’s 
government (2002-6), but the deal provoked discontent and growing social 
unrest. In the face of vocal opposition to CAFTA, Pacheco delayed sending 
the Agreement to the Costa Rican Parliament for ratification until October 
2007.  In 2008, President Oscar Arias made implementation of CAFTA his 
government’s key policy goal.  The idea of a referendum had been floated for 
some time, and in September 2005, a survey undertaken by the University of 
Costa Rica, showed that more than two thirds (69 per cent) of those polled 
supported a binding national referendum on CAFTA. In the same poll, 58 per 
cent of those polled were opposed to CAFTA (Tucker, 2006). 
Anti-CAFTA social movements and other organisations were focused on 
public action and mobilization strategies, for example through large street 
demonstrations and protests.  They engaged in grassroots work and awareness-
raising at community level. However, prior to announcement of the 
Referendum, the proposal divided opinion among anti-CAFTA activists 
(interviews with Eva, Alberto, Martín). Perhaps in part for this reason it does 
seem in retrospect that the NO movement – and its members – were not that 
well prepared to take part in an electoral Referendum campaign.   
The idea for a Referendum was first put forward by a group of citizens 
opposed to CAFTA, who formally asked the Electoral Tribunal (TSE) for a 
Referendum to be organised. This request was approved in April 2007 by the 
TSE, but President Arias instead decided to call for a Referendum himself.  
The Arias’ administration decided that Costa Ricans would be asked to choose 
between a simple “yes” and “no” for CAFTA membership and ratification. 
Although they had previously resisted proposals for a Referendum, the 
government and most leading figures in authority were now converted to the 
idea (Giralt, 2007). The President’s proposal was speedily approved by 
Parliament and then by TSE in May, and was announced on 12 July 2007.  The 
effect was to completely by-passed the original request, which had been a 
formal citizens’ request.  Arising from a political deal struck between the 
executive, legislature and judiciary, the Referendum process was to be 
contested from the start (Corrales, Soley, & Campos, 2007).   
3.2 ‘Trouble in Paradise’? 
From the 1940s to around the late 1980s, Costa Rica created a model of social, 
economic and political development and democratic governance that was 
widely considered one of the most stable and successful in the region. The 
main ingredients in this ‘fairy tale’ were: high state expenditure; consistently 
high levels of public investment in the country’s social and economic 
infrastructure, and public services, provided free. Together these were generally 
  25
able to ensure a good level of what is now termed ‘human security’ for most 
Costa Ricans. Military and national security were deliberately de-emphasized in 
favour of resource reallocation to democratic political institutions and 
processes and economic and social entitlements. A consolidated democratic 
electoral system, stable social institutions and legal mechanisms designed to 
protect citizens’ basic rights reinforced a welfare system in which primary 
health care, education, social protection and employment were more or less 
ensured. This ‘ideal’ mixed economy also combined export-oriented sectors 
with foreign investment. Strategic economic sectors, like telecommunications, 
electricity and insurance, remained in national, public hands, and income was 
redistributed through some progressive taxation.  Those with more resources 
were supposed to subsidize free or low-cost services for those who could not 
afford to pay. The outcome was a reasonable degree of realization of basic 
social and economic rights, and relatively low levels of poverty, social exclusion 
and inequality, by regional and Latin American standards. 
Whilst other countries in the region suffered deep and growing levels of 
social and income inequality, violent civil wars, and military take-overs, Costa 
Rica achieved reasonable and steady levels of economic growth which helped 
ensure political stability into the 1990s.  Whilst the system provided a sense of 
human security for the poor, the main beneficiaries were the growing middle 
class, and this was taken as an indicator of the success of the human-centred 
mixed economy development model. 
These are significant achievements. But the Costa Rican model of 
development is often idealized in the national and international social 
imaginary. The country is not – and never has been – a ‘paradise’ in terms of 
the daily life experiences of most inhabitants.  Social dynamics of economic, 
political, social and cultural exclusion have affected a broad sweep of the 
population, for whom inclusion remains a daily struggle. Poor rural women, 
children, indigenous people, gays and lesbians, and cross-border migrants, have 
not benefitted proportionally. The system was riddled with problems of 
corruption even during the Costa Rican social economy’s ‘heyday’, and this 
problem has become entrenched in the past two decades, with high-profile 
scandals coinciding with market-oriented reforms. Since 2001, two 
governments have been brought down in this way (Lehoucq, 2005).  
From the early 1980s, neo-liberal market-oriented reforms started to 
weaken the classical social, economic and political development model for 
which Costa Rica was well know. As elsewhere, IMF and World Bank-imposed 
structural adjustment policies (SAPs) began as a way to deal with the country’s 
growing external debt (Hidalgo Capitán, 2000; Programa Estado de la Nación 
Costa Rica, 2006). The SAP reforms implied limiting the role of the state, 
reducing social expenditure and privatizing public services.  Liberalization of 
markets meant removing protection for domestic production and removing 
restrictions on capital movements in and out of the country. Development and 
employment were both to be based on economic growth driven by foreign 
investment rather than on domestically-controlled industries and government 
services. SAP measures were implemented in a less dramatic way in Costa Rica 
than in many other Central American countries like El Salvador or Honduras.  
But the result has been to undermine the Costa Rican state’s capacity to 
promote social justice, fulfil economic and social development goals, and 
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continue with redistributory social policies. Arguably, civil and political rights 
have also suffered setbacks in Costa Rica since the 1980s (Lehoucq, 2005).  
Carazo (2007) gives indicators of the deteriorating economic and social 
conditions: ‘During the past two decades Costa Rica had public social 
investment levels lower than those attained by the late 1970s … by 2005, 
public social investment per inhabitant was 21 per cent lower than twenty years 
earlier’ (Programa Estado de la Nación Costa Rica, 2006: 23). The 
concentration of wealth has continuously increased (ibid.), and between 1988 
and 2005, the income of the poorest fifth of the population dropped by 13.9 
per cent, whilst the income of the wealthiest fifth increased by more than two 
thirds (67.9 per cent). Although some new jobs were created, in 2005 two 
thirds of these new jobs were in the informal sector.  According to Carazo, 
there was: ‘…a deterioration in the quality of working conditions for 
most…people in the country’ (ibid.). In view of this background, it was not 
surprising that the NO movement defended, first and foremost, the historically 
‘mixed’, Costa Rican social economy model of development during the 
CAFTA Referendum. 
3.3 Arguments against CAFTA 
According to its supporters, CAFTA would provide access to ‘the biggest 
market in the world’, the US, and this would eventually produce ‘thousands of 
new jobs’ in the formal and informal sectors, through attracting Foreign Direct 
Investment into Costa Rica (Lizano Ortiz, 2006). From the very start of the 
CAFTA negotiations, two concerns were raised over the process and 
procedures involved.  The first related to: ‘the contents and implications of the 
negotiations’ and the second to the specific ‘procedure followed’ by 
government and the negotiating team of the Ministerio de Comercio Exterior 
(COMEX)’, when agreeing the terms of CAFTA in Costa Rica (Florez-Estrada 
& Hernández, 2004). These two sets of concerns went on to inform the 
messages and outlook of the NO campaign and anti-CAFTA social movement 
during the Referendum of October 2007. We explore each in turn.   
The first problem - CAFTA’s prioritization of commercial and private 
interests over principles of common good and social solidarity – is seen as a 
particular problem because it contradicts the basic principles of the Costa 
Rican Constitution. Free competition and progressively less regulated foreign 
investment in particular threaten the whole harmonious model of state-societal 
relations on which the Costa Rican development model was built in the first 
place. Now viewed as under threat from ideologies hostile to the state, the 
model was defended by the NO Movement during the Referendum campaign.  
Indeed, the NO movement claimed its legitimacy derived from protecting the 
existing (and already rapidly disappearing) model of national development, 
based on social inclusion and solidarity, not unfettered market competition.  
During the CAFTA Referendum process, the anti-CAFTA movement 
pointed to the likely negative impacts of pro-market policies for health and 
food rights, as well as other basic rights.  There was no reference whatsoever in 
CAFTA to human rights. CAFTA also exposed some of the pre-existing flaws 
of the Costa Rican system in the post-war era.  The Constitution enshrined the 
principles of the common good and fiscal and economic solidarity, and this 
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seemed to protect citizens’ most basic rights. On the other hand, the vision 
underpinning this was of a strictly limited, liberal democracy where political 
participation rights were confined mainly to civil and political rights, such as 
freedom of expression and the right to participate in electoral processes. Many 
basic economic, social and cultural rights achieved during the post-war years 
turned out to have been inadequately protected under the constitution. The 
right to work – for example – which forms the basis for realizing many other 
rights, including health, basic nutrition, decent housing, and education – was 
nowhere guaranteed under national law (Mora, 2006). The Constitution of 
Costa Rica was never amended so that the government would be obliged to 
meet its international obligations under human rights instruments that the 
country had ratified, for example in relation to women, children, the protection 
of indigenous minorities or the natural the environment. 
A second set of objections to CAFTA related to the actual negotiation 
process. The complete lack of transparency of the process, the lack of useful 
information so the public could debate the issues, were all pointed to, as was 
the lack of any sustained civil society participation, or even genuine popular 
consultation, in the CAFTA negotiation process. The lack of clear information 
about CAFTA and what it implied was viewed as a serious problem, since it 
implied that negotiations (and later the Referendum) would take place without 
adequate and informed public debate. There was instead a lot of simplistic – 
and sometimes misleading –  pro-CAFTA propaganda in the mass media, 
circulated through expensive government and corporate PR operations. 
Although the government claimed there had been extensive and widespread 
debate on CAFTA, in which the public was participating, such claims were 
challenged by the NO movement (Martínez Franzoni, 2004; Pacheco, 2004).   
Critics also argue that the negotiation procedure was marred by the 
disproportionate amount of money spent on pro-CAFTA messages in the 
mass media. Consultation and participation processes promoted by 
government were skewed by this combination of high spending on advertising, 
and inadequate reliable public information (Martínez-Franzoni, 2004; Pacheco, 
2004). Concerns also arose over irregularities in the signed CAFTA agreement. 
Strategic sectors, especially telecommunications and insurance, were included 
in the agreement even though Costa Rican citizens had been publicly and 
officially assured these would not be included in CAFTA. Payments to Costa 
Rican CAFTA negotiators from US sources were denounced in the press 
(Rivera, 2003, 20 June). Even after they resigned, some of these CAFTA 
negotiators found work in Por Costa Rica, which ran the high profile pro-
CAFTA media campaign, with financial backing from US sources.   
3.4 The rise of the NO movement 
Compared with the highly organized, entrenched and well-funded pro-CAFTA 
political forces, the Movimiento Patriótico NO al TLC (Patriotic NO Movement 
opposed to CAFTA) started out as a loose, mostly voluntary coalition of actors 
and interests, involving different social and institutional actors and demands. 
The Movement received very little funding from abroad or within Costa Rica, 
and had to rely on voluntary contributions from members. The membership 
base was in social organizations such as public sector organizations, trade 
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unions and a range of civic groups, many already mobilized against CAFTA 
pre-2007. On the basis of different interest-based and moral claims, they were 
united in their opposition to CAFTA. The NO movement mobilized trade 
unionists, members of environmental groups, specific professions, women’s 
organizations, church members, public sector workers, students, academics, 
indigenous people and organizations of the urban and rural poor. 
From around 2002, the National Coordinating Committee Against CAFTA, 
with national and regional branches, emerged to start coordinating anti-
CAFTA public action.  This later formed a base for the NO movement.  
Political party membership could also be important; the ‘Citizen Action Party’ 
(PAC) was represented in Parliament, and also joined the NO movement.  
Another group of politicians in the ruling National Liberation Party (PLN) 
disagreed with CAFTA, and going against the party line, joined forces with the 
anti-CAFTA movement. Independent public institutions, like state universities 
(UCR, UNA and ITCR) and the Office of the Ombudsman, later provided 
important ‘meeting spaces’ and organizing nodes for the NO campaign.  They 
issued combined warnings about CAFTA’s likely negative impacts. Finally, 
religious and faith-based groups in the movement included the Catholic 
Church, and some protestant groups were also highly critical of CAFTA. In 
reality, most members of the NO movement combined several affiliations at 
once: one could be a Catholic trade unionist in the public sector, for example, 
as well as an indigenous poor urban woman.  
In the run up to the Referendum, the Patriotic Committee Supporting the 
National Campaign against CAFTA (formerly called National Front Supporting the 
Struggle Against CAFTA) started to gain a higher profile through official 
endorsements from prominent ‘personalities’ in national political, artistic and 
academic life. These ‘celebrities’ (by Costa Rican standards) lent the emerging 
NO movement a higher profile within Costa Rica and beyond. Another 
interesting collective body was the Conversatorios.  In these loose meetings, 
representatives of different sectors could come together to devise more 
strategic and creative ways of organizing the anti-CAFTA movement.    
These relatively decentralized initiatives all eventually combined to form 
the NO movement and campaign in 2007. Together they formed a Costa Rican 
‘Rainbow alliance’ or ‘Movement of the movements’, based on a ‘politics of 
solidarity’ (Hintjens, 2006b). Many involved in the NO movement had 
previously been involved in the Combo ICE (Instituto Costaricense de Electricidad). 
In 2000, this network had mobilised Costa Ricans to protect the National 
Electricity Company from privatisation.  Combo ICE had agitated so 
effectively that the Costa Rican government had backed down (Carazo, 2007).  
Over the past two decades or so, social mobilizations in Costa Rica have 
arisen from an on-going sense of a malaise, a sense of a crisis of legitimacy on the 
part of traditional democratic institutions. The value of political parties and 
political representatives has been questioned, as well as the key institutions of 
the executive, legislative and judicial (Alvarenga Venutolo, 2005; Rojas, 2005). 
Corruption scandals added to a sense that formal structures lacked authenticity 
when two ex-presidents were found guilty of corruption. Even the 
Constitutional Chamber has made questionable decisions. In 2007, for 
example, a dispute arose concerning the Constitutional Chamber’s decision 
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that CAFTA was constitutional and could go ahead. This conclusion was flatly 
contradicted by two major studies – one by the University of Costa Rica 
(Comisión Especial sobre Roces Constitucionales del TLC, 2007) and the other 
by the Costa Rican Ombudsman’s Office (the Defensoría de los Habitantes) 
(Zeledón, 2006). Both these studies expressed grave concerns about CAFTA’s 
likely negative impact on Costa Rican people’s and human rights, concluding 
that allowing such damage would be unconstitutional.   
In sum, the NO movement arose from a broad social and civil society 
networks, spanning people in the public sector and government, and even 
some in the legislature. Organising through networks, broad-based coalitions, 
informal groups, and formal organizations, the NO movement was rooted in 
earlier anti-CAFTA and anti-neo-liberal mobilisations.  Section 4 considers 
how the NO movement claimed rights, especially political participation rights, 
through complaints procedures, dialogue and protests in relation to the 
organizational structures and formal institutions of the Costa Rican state. The 
claiming of rights described in Section 4 happened alongside the exercising of 
rights which forms the subject matter for Section 5; each approach was taking 
place at the same time, so they are not opposed in logic. They are two different 
ways the NO movement and its members sought to realize political 
participation rights, and thus to extend democratic processes in Costa Rica.  
4 POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: RIGHTS CLAIMS 
During the 2007 Referendum, various actors and institutions in the NO 
movement claimed that people’s political participation rights were being 
violated instead of being respected, protected and fulfilled. The common 
denominator of these claims was that the state, the main duty-bearer in relation 
to human rights, should be held fully accountable for proper functioning of 
democratic and legal procedures and decision-making.  In other words, all 
these claims were aimed at holding the state accountable to the wider public; to 
Costa Rican citizens. We focus on two groups of claims that arose and were 
observed to be especially significant for NO movement participants. The first 
claims concerned the role of political authorities and democratic institutions. 
The second concerned the role of the media. This second set of claims are 
closely related to the first, since mainstream media contributed significantly, as 
a key cultural agent, to the construction of a ‘common sense’ around CAFTA 
membership.  It is not clear that these claims by the NO movement ensured 
that citizens’ basic rights to political participation have will be better respected, 
protected or fulfilled by the Costa Rican state in future.  However, the claims 
in themselves may broaden how political participation rights are understood in 
the Costa Rican context; this is a question we return to in Section 6. 
4.1 Claims against the organs of state 
Throughout the campaign, NO movement’s members continually expressed 
their concerns about the Referendum process itself, through a series of formal 
consultations, complaints and objections to how various national and regional 
institutions were working, or not working, in the process. The NO movement 
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activists especially raised issues of transparency in connection with electoral 
processes. Legal claims and objections were lodged to bring public and official 
attention to the perceived democratic deficits of the whole Referendum 
process. The NO movement also tried to hold state institutions responsible for 
their failure to oversee the process (Corrales et al, 2007). The written legal 
claims, submitted by individuals6 , which we consider, also represented wider 
concerns of the anti-CAFTA NO movement, which expressed its claims to 
political participation rights mainly through such legal and constitutional 
channels.   
 
Claims were also made informally, since legal claims were backed up through 
street demonstrations, symbolic public acts and statements, and all kinds of 
information and signs circulated by email and through websites.  The NO 
movement hoped to demonstrate to a range of actors, citizens and potential 
participants in the movement, that the institutions and procedural mechanisms 
governing the Referendum were inherently biased and inadequate. 
4.1.1 The claim of a lack of government impartiality 
The fist legal claim related to improper application of Article 95 of the 
Constitution and Article 88 of the Electoral Code. These articles establish the 
principle that governmental authorities should be neutral so as to guarantee the 
fairness of elections. Article 88 explicitly states that the President of the 
Republic, the Ministries and other authorities: 
…cannot participate in the activities of the political parties, take part in societies 
and meetings of a political character, use the authority and the influence vested in 
their positions to benefit political parties, place emblems on their houses or 
vehicles, nor make partisan declarations of any kind (República de Costa Rica, 
1953). 
The Electoral Tribunal (TSE) did not include this provision into laws 
governing the CAFTA Referendum. When repeatedly asked to justify this 
exclusion, the TSE responded that a Referendum was not an election.  The 
TSA claimed that restrictions that would normally operate during an election 
process would not apply to a Referendum, since a Referendum was a special 
kind of voting arrangement, and not an election as such. There were no 
competing political parties or candidates (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, 
2007b, 2007c). The Yes/No vote characteristic of a referendum did not require 
similar precautions, argued the TSE.   Even though the general prohibition on 
the use of public resources for campaigning did apply to the Referendum, the 
TSE insisted that wider obligation to protect ‘freedom of expression’ under 
Article 28 of the Constitution justified their decision not to apply the principle 
of public authority neutrality in the case of the CAFTA Referendum.   
                                                 
6 Among them politicians, entrepreuner and academics. 
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Not surprisingly, this interpretation of the law was disputed, and an 
official complaint was lodged against the TSE’s decision not to ban the public 
authorities from campaigning for (or against) CAFTA. It was argued that this 
decision undermined the rights of ordinary citizens to free political 
participation (Corrales et al, 2007).  This complaint against the TSE was not 
successful, and an appeal was lodged with the Constitutional Chamber, even 
though it was known the final decision lay with the TSE and not the 
Constitutional Chamber. Formally, within Costa Rica, there was no legal 
mechanism to appeal a decisions or resolution of the TSE.  Given this, in spite 
of the symbolic appeal to the Constitutional Chamber, the NO movement’s 
appeal was not successful.  
The complaint then continued up to the regional level, where it was 
lodged with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) at 
the end of August 2007. The Costa Rican State, the President of the Republic, 
magistrates of the TSE and members of the directory of Parliament, were all 
accused of having failed to adhere to the country’s constitutional and electoral 
principles (Corrales et al, 2007).  It was also argued that the way the authorities 
had announced the Referendum7, and the way governmental authorities were 
overtly backing the YES campaign, were unconstitutional and indeed illegal.  
A second complaint was lodged with the Inter-American Human Rights 
Commission concerning the lack of adequate information about CAFTA. This 
complaint also concerned the unequal resources and publicity available to each 
side in the Referendum process, in spite of the formal rules that specified that 
resources spent should be equal.  It was claimed this made the Referendum an 
inherently unfair process.  This claim to the IACHR alleged that resolutions of 
TSE were arbitrary and unjustified, and that the state had failed to guarantee 
any appeal mechanisms for decisions of the TSE.  For the IACHR, these 
claims were re-framed in terms of violations of rights under the specific 
provisions of American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR). The 
complaints cited Article 1 on the duty to incorporate the rights and freedoms 
in the Convention into domestic legislation, and Article 2 on Political Rights, 
especially the provision that suffrage should be the ‘free expression of the will 
of the voters’.  Article 23 on the Right to Equal Protection before the Law, and 
Article 24 on the Right to Judicial Protection, were also cited. Reparation was 
requested for these rights violations, and modification of national legislation so 
that citizens and voters’ rights could be better protected in future. 
The NO movement, by lodging these formal complaints, was trying to 
ensure that the minimum conditions necessary for a fair Referendum would be 
achieved.  At the same time, the complaints helped publicise and highlight – 
nationally as well as regionally – how the Costa Rican authorities were using 
their own position of authority to influence the whole process of calling and 
organizing the Referendum.  The underlying logic of these claims was that 
                                                 
7 This issue will not be analyzed in this study which has prioritized claims with more 
general resonance among the NO activists and which were also present in other 
informal claims. 
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such abuses of public authority served to undermine citizens’ basic political 
participation rights, spoiling a broadly democratic political system (Annex 4). 
According to these claims, the rules of the electoral game were being 
skewed through a mixture of political clientelism, disinformation and partial 
information, and bullying and intimidation of opponents.  These methods 
prevented citizens from taking part in a meaningful process of political choice.  
Besides official and formal bending of the rules, the claims before the IACHR 
exposed the means used by those in government, including overt bribery of the 
poorest and working class sectors of Costa Ricans, offering public works 
projects, vouchers, access to housing, scholarships and subsidies, all to inflate 
the YES vote.  And beside these ‘carrots’, the public authorities were also 
claimed to be using ‘sticks’, including dire warnings that people would lose 
their jobs, that essential public services (e.g. electricity, water, telephone) would 
collapse if CAFTA was not approved (Corrales et al, 2007).  In the complaints 
brought by members of the NO movements in late 2007, evidence was 
provided of all these claimed malpractices (Corrales et al, 2007). 
The complexity of the CAFTA document was an additional problem for 
the NO movement. Even for university professors and students, CAFTA 
proved extremely difficult to understand. There was no accessible, summarized 
version of CAFTA, and this was viewed as further evidence of obfuscation by 
a government, failing to provide the information, without which meaningful 
political participation was not possible among the electorate. Voters, according 
to the NO movement, were placed in a vulnerable position, where their fears 
for the future could easily be manipulated by those favouring CAFTA. The 
authorities thus controlled all the levers through which their hold over the 
electorate could be reinforced (Corrales et al, 2007).  Such violations of 
citizens’ basic political rights, including freedom of thought and opinion, were 
denounced by the NO movement (Benedicto Salmerón, 2008; Umaña 
Venegas, 2007a).   
The substance of these claims by the NO movement cannot be addressed 
in substance in this study without straying outside our topic. However, on just 
one of these claims, during fieldwork there was substantial evidence available 
of the kinds of pressures being brought to bear on the electorate.  For instance, 
reports were common of workers being forced to listen to pro-CAFTA 
speeches in the workplace, and receiving dire warnings that if CAFTA was not 
approved, they might lose their jobs.   
What the NO movement participants hoped to communicate to the 
general Costa Rican public was how a clear set of self-interests and 
connections existed between those with the economic clout (corporate and 
media capital) and those with political privileges. This represented a warning: 
this unholy alliance was out to violate citizens´ basic rights to meaningful 
political participation in the Referendum process. 
  4.1.2 The claim of an undermining of the democratic rule of law 
The NO movement claims – it was argued - went to the very heart of the 
democratic political system in Costa Rica. Underlying the various legal and 
other claims of the NO movement was the view that manipulation and 
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corruption by rulers and leaders were producing a ‘disconnect’ between the 
dominant democratic institutions and the popular will. Existing institutions 
were losing legitimacy and relevance by no longer being seen to be responsive 
or accountable to the basic interests and needs of ordinary Costa Ricans8. 
Rulings by the TSE, for example, were viewed as having seriously undermined 
faith of ordinary citizens in state institutions, since the TSE’s decisions were 
coming to be seen as directly responsive only to economic and political elites’ 
concerns with self-preservation. 
The resulting situation was described by Vargas (2007) as ‘the hijacked 
Rule of Law’ (La institucionalidad secuestrada) and by Giralt (2007) as ‘Dubious 
Institutionalism’ (La Institucionalidad Cuestionda). Academics and researchers 
especially expressed openly their concern that economic and political elites in 
the country were actively trying to silence critical voices, by closing down 
alternative spaces for debate.  Such claims were mostly made by the more 
established elements in the NO movement, concerned with academic 
autonomy, for example, and press freedom.  They denounced the routine 
misuse of institutional mechanisms for the purposes of promoting a YES vote. 
These claims were often expressed in creative ways, through satirical graphic 
images and posters, for example, which contrasted the NO movement’s 
vulnerability to ‘bully boy’ tactics from those in authority with defiance and 
refusal to be intimidated (for a good example see Annex 5).  Such images 
worked alongside complaints made through formal, legal channels. 
Most of these claims by the NO movement were framed with respect to a 
solidly liberal democratic or perhaps social democratic understanding of 
democracy and the rule of law. The central, twinned themes of such claims 
were that democratic governmental accountability was the vital pre-condition 
for meaningful and active citizenship participation. There were other examples 
of claim-based action outside the formal legal and constitutional spheres. In a  
public demonstration against the TSE decisions, members of Mujeres de Blanco9 
chained themselves to the railings of the TSE building. They symbolically 
covered their mouths with gags to express outrage at the indirect restrictions 
imposed on the NO movement by the TSE’s decision. Liberal democratic 
principles were not questioned, however, and the protestors emphasized: ‘We 
want to draw an important distinction; we retain full confidence in the 
institution (i.e. the TSE), but not in the current leaders’ (Mujeres de Blanco, 
2007).    
For most of the NO movement, claims for political participation rights 
were expressed in terms of ‘democracy’, suggesting that ethical values and 
active citizenship were closely intertwined.  Informal and formal claims of the 
                                                 
8 That feeling of being betrayed by corrupted institutional representatives has been 
gradually increasing with the application of neoliberal reforms and expressed openly 
by the social movements since the middle of 1990’s (Alvarenga 2005). 
9 A group of women mainly from the middle class which emerged in the context of 
the Referendum.  Their  name and actions are inspired by another group of women 
who played an important role in 1947 protesting for irregularities and fraud in an 
electoral process and demanding electoral guarantees (Gámez, 2007). 
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NO movement stressed the interdependency between different sets of rights 
claims. In July 2007, for example, a woman’s network again organized a public 
demonstration in front of the TSE, explaining its position as follows: 
‘All women against CAFTA’ (Todas contra el TLC) represents the collective 
demand of the initiatives of many individual women and women’s organizations  
that work actively to oppose approval of CAFTA, and that seek actively to 
defend democracy and freedom of expression.  Because they want to get this 
treaty approved at any price, even if that involves twisting arms, buying votes, 
and trying to muzzle people… (Jiménez, 2007). 
Having thus denounced violations of citizens’ political rights, the protestors 
emphasized how CAFTA implementation would undermine the rule of law 
and negatively affect various other sets of rights (economic, social and cultural 
in particular). They openly opposed the vision and values of the form of 
economic development promoted by CAFTA. In addition, they warned the 
general citizenry about the manipulation taking place and invited them to 
question what they were told, and to actively debate dominant viewpoints, by 
seeking alternative sources of information.  Alternative, ethical conceptions of 
development were defended in these protests, with claims that economic life 
should involve other values besides competition and global marketisation, 
since: ‘…the life of the people and the planet is important’.  That wealth is 
‘spiritual’ as well as ‘material’ was part of the NO movement’s overall message. 
Material entitlements were seen as vital, but also as part of a wider vision of the 
good society that the NO movement was struggling for. The struggle was for 
ethical values, national identity and a country in which people’s basic rights 
claims could be defended. 
4.2 Claiming voice, denouncing disinformation 
Most of the media in Costa Rica is in private hands. This includes the main 
television and radio stations as well as high-circulation newspapers. A survey 
conducted for the Human Development Report in 2005 reported that most 
people in the country (58%) were informed by television, mainly REPRETEL 
and Telenoticias, the two main broadcasting companies.  Just 13% of those 
surveyed reported radio as their main source of information; with 29% mainly 
getting their news from newspapers. The most widely read papers were the 
‘quality’ La Nación and the sensationalist La Extra (Sandoval García, 2007). 
Claims about the role of the media were a very significant part of overall 
rights claims by the NO movement during the Referendum campaign, 
reflecting that the media was a crucial space for realization of rights to 
information for the general citizenry. Moreover in Costa Rica the media – 
especially the TV –  played a very significant role in relation to the right to 
vote, since it controlled the expression of views, the representation of 
opinions, and for most of the public was the main single source of ‘factual’ 
information on CAFTA and debates around its likely future impacts.  
During the Referendum, there were some minority and more critical 
sources of news, including the Semanario Universidad newspaper, a non-
commercial weekly publication produced by the public university. During the 
campaign the Semanario Universidad provided an important set of media spaces, 
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through which those in the NO movement could express their views, and hope 
to reach a wider audience. The hope was that in this way the general citizenry 
could become better informed about more critical perspectives on CAFTA, in 
contrast to those represented in private, pro-CAFTA, media channels 
supporting the YES vote.  Alternative media spaces were at a disadvantage, 
however. They appeared less regularly, there was no access to TV, limited 
access to radio, and budgets were low, which meant low circulation compared 
with more commercial media outlets, especially TV (Informatico, 2007).   
Concerns were repeatedly expressed about inequalities in resources and 
access to airtime and space, before, during – and also after - the Referendum. 
Basically, the two sides in the CAFTA debate had very uneven media access.  
One study by Media Gurú noted that during the period January-July 2007, the 
YES campaign outspent the NO campaign on publicity tenfold.  Radio and 
print media – with much lower audiences than TV – were the means used by 
the NO campaign.  However, internet was also very important in getting the 
movement’s message across to a wider audience, and we consider its role in 
more detail in Section 5 (Córdoba Morales, 2007).  
To back its claims that the mainstream media displayed a consistent bias 
for YES arguments, with resulting uneven coverage of issues and arguments 
around CAFTA, the NO movement showed how ‘news’ during the campaign 
period was framed so that YES arguments were given far more time and 
credibility. The media presented issues in ways that deformed and silenced the 
arguments of the NO campaign.  Mainstream media spaces were seen as being 
constructed as publicity agents for the YES campaign. TV news and radio 
sought to create the impression of impartiality, by included some NO 
movement arguments in their reporting, but this was usually done in order to 
undermine the credibility of these counter-arguments.  The news was more like 
advertising, than like ‘balanced’ or fair presentation of the ‘facts’10.   
According to one journalist with Semanario Universidad, the main problem 
was the way the mainstream media constructed ‘issues’ and ‘problems’ around 
CAFTA.  Their pre-definition of what the crucial issues were led to alternative 
voices being excluded in advance (interview with María).  Data was commonly 
manipulated and partial information, or even wrong information, was provided 
and repeated. This happened during the campaign, as well as more generally, 
when the mainstream media was seen as trivialising debates around CAFTA so 
that it came to appear as if ‘personalities’ were at stake rather than real political 
argumentation. A common approach was to explore sensational, but relatively 
insignificant, details to boost the channel’s viewer ratings.  Relevant but 
difficult-to-understand information about CAFTA was thus silenced by being 
ignored and pushed into the background, rather than by being coherently 
refuted through clear arguments against the NO position and its advocates.  
                                                 
10 The managing of informative spaces (news) was considered to be a crucial issue to 
the result of the Referendum.  Some analysis considered the situation a ‘Mediatic 
Fraude’ (González Hernández, 2007; Le Monde Diplomatique, 2007). 
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According to Sandoval Garcia (2007), political parties were already in 
decline, with weakening membership bases. They were also divided – including 
internally - on the CAFTA membership issue.  La Nación had become the voice 
of big business and corporate interests, which meant: ‘taking on itself the role 
of national interlocutor for the idea that modernization is the best guarantee of 
welfare’ (Sandoval Garcia, 2007).  From this perspective, the mainstream media 
played a key role in constructing neoliberal and neoconservative ideas as 
‘common sense’. This had started long before the 2007 CAFTA Referendum 
campaign. Voting for CAFTA became obvious rather than remarkable; it was 
‘different’ to suggest that anyone should vote NO. In other words, CAFTA 
was made into part of the normalized economic, political and cultural 
discourses, as the media framed the news in ways that dismissed the concerns 
of the NO movement as trivial or unrealistic.   
Not surprisingly, many in the NO movement denounced the TV news 
during the CAFTA Referendum campaign as simple disinformation. They 
pointed to personalized attacks on NO movement leaders, citing this as 
evidence of bias.  Alternative ways of sending and circulating information were 
therefore used in order to circumvent the ‘blind spots’ of mainstream TV, 
particularly the internet and world wide web.11  The NO movement also 
circulated a range of popular symbols, types of clothing, stickers and other 
forms of publicity materials on public display. By doing all this, the NO 
movement hoped to call attention to the ‘dirty tricks’ the mainstream media 
was using to slant the CAFTA debate towards a YES vote (Annex 6).  
Another, related concern of the NO movement was the lack of public 
spaces in which ‘alternative’ perspectives could be voiced, so that a sustained 
debate and discussion could take place between the YES and NO campaigns 
around the implications of CAFTA.  We have shown this was the case for 
television (Sandoval García, 2007).  When members of the NO movement 
appeared on TV to express doubts about the fairness of the Referendum 
campaign, or complain of bias, they were not presented as champions of 
political citizen participation, but simply as people who liked to complain, and 
as ‘negative’ individuals.  The private ownership of television did not prevent 
them supporting the incumbent government as loyally as any state TV might 
have done.  Voter audiences were thus denied access to reliable or even semi-
balanced information about the likely implications of CAFTA for the country’s 
future economic, social and political development.  There were some 
exceptions.  Towards the end of the campaign, the TSE organized a series of 
public debates about CAFTA on the State TV Channel (Canal 13), which 
attracted huge public audience. Some private channels copied this initiative, 
because it attracted viewing audiences, but such openness came late in the day. 
To sum this up; inequalities in resources and in media spaces, combined 
with manipulation and silencing of certain kinds of informed debate, certainly 
                                                 
11 This was especially interesting in terms of its pre-figuring how bi-partisan use of 
mainstream media and alternative internet and web-based messages evolved during 
the 2008 US Presidential election campaign.  
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undermined the freedom of expression and access to information of Costa 
Rican citizens during the CAFTA Referendum.  Both these rights can in turn 
be considered vital to citizens being able to exercise their right a free vote.  
One key problem discussed during the campaign was that legal provisions in 
domestic laws and in the Referendum Law itself, did not make any provision 
for intervention to regulate media coverage in terms of balance and bias in how 
positions and issues were represented.  The debate revolved around what kinds 
of mechanisms might make the media more officially accountable for the 
quality of its coverage (Boza & Rojas, 2007a; Corrales et al, 2007; Sandoval 
García, 2007).  Both the electoral Tribunal (TSE) and the NO movement 
(through initiatives like the website ‘notlc.com’) monitored the role of media 
during the campaign, observing the way the news regarding CAFTA and the 
Referendum was portrayed in TV, on radio and in the newspapers.  
Interestingly, mainstream commercial media like La Nación was opposed to any 
kind of monitoring, from whatever source (including by the TSE), and instead 
appealed (as TSE had also done) to principles of freedom of information and 
the press to prevent itself being observed (Umaña Venegas, 2007b).  Press 
freedoms were generally defended by the corporate media as a way to avoid 
regulation. Meanwhile, the NO movement and civil society groups tended to 
assert that freedom of expression implied the right of communication and 
voice for different positions, and the right to information, both of which were 
seen as pre-conditions for a meaningful vote in the Referendum.12    
If the research we have referred to is reliable - as it would seem to be, on 
the basis of observation – then the complaints of the NO movement members 
were reasonably well-founded. The formal, legal instruments meant to protect 
free elections, free expression, access to information and a balanced press, 
failed to protect citizens’ rights during the CAFTA Referendum. This 
undermined their political participation rights.  Not only was the situation 
repeatedly denounced by the NO movement; in addition, in its press and TV 
monitoring, the TSE did recognise that balanced reporting had not been 
achieved.  The need for regulation mechanisms to ensure greater media 
accountability was much discussed both inside and outside the NO movement 
during the Referendum campaign (Boza & Rojas, 2007a; Sandoval García, 
2007; Interviews).   
Since the private media was allied with – and even owned by – Costa 
Rican political and economic elites, its role in reproducing dominant discourse 
around CAFTA was not that surprising.  The lack of media regulation – rather 
than over-regulation – was what reduced media spaces open to the NO 
Movement, obliging them to create spaces of their own, in order to get their 
own interpretations of CAFTA across to the wider public.  Some examples of 
this are presented in Section 5, which draws more extensively on the views of 
NO movement participants.  We consider media (and other) spaces in which 
political participation rights were exercised and realised by NO movement 
members and organisations.   
                                                 
12 Observatory for the Freedom of Expression (Boza & Rojas, 2007a). 
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5 EXERCISING RIGHTS, ACTING COLLECTIVELY 
In this section we focus on what the NO movement was able to achieve during 
the CAFTA Referendum process in terms of making citizens’ rights to political 
participation more meaningful.  Those in the NO movement were involved in 
evolving rights-based practices that sought to fulfil their participation rights, 
not perfectly, but through trial-and-error. As the key duty-bearer, the state was 
supposed to fulfil its obligations to protect political participation rights of 
Costa Rican citizens. But as suggested in Section 4, there were limits on the 
willingness and capacity of the institutions of state to do so. For the NO 
movement to go ahead and facilitate the exercise of political participation 
rights was preferable to simply waiting for a miracle to happen.   
NO movement participants thus created spaces through both virtual and 
face-to-face and visual means, and we will explore some how some shared 
features and messages of anti-CAFTA NO campaigns, including the campaigns 
of Patriotic Committees (PCs), the central coordinating committee and the 
vital role of internet and website communications, were realised.  NO 
movement visual campaigning materials are included here and analysed, and 
our hope is to show how democratic meanings and practices were built into 
such media and organisational expressions and spaces of the NO movement.  
Organizational spaces and media spaces constitute the two key spheres in 
which political participation rights were exercised by the NO movement during 
the Referendum campaign.  Each represents an important cultural space, and 
in each a process of communication took place through which common 
understandings of rights and issues were framed and acted upon by NO 
movement actors. Throughout this section, we note how closely practices and 
meanings of political participation are inter-connected within the media and 
organisational spaces of the NO movement.   
Indeed, the NO Movement exercised political participation in the very 
process of constructing and consolidating its campaign against CAFTA.  
Engagement in rights-promoting action was apparent for movement members, 
but was also visible to the general public, through forms of organisation and 
messages that challenged the mainstream trivialization of debate around 
CAFTA.  Democratic notions and practices of politics informed how NO 
movement participants’ exercised their rights to venture beyond liberal notions 
of the democratic, and how broader social and cultural dimensions of rights 
construction and citizens’ involvement became part of their political 
participation practices. In rights realization, the processes and institutions 
involved are not neatly separable, and are sometimes inter-constitutive of one 
another, as in the NO movement.   
5.1 The NO movement: a campaign network 
The movement that brought together social forces seeking a NO vote in the 
Referendum was ‘a campaign of campaigns’, both in how it generated its 
messages and in the mode of its organizational practices. The organizational 
structure was a typical ‘network’ of loosely connected, decentralized coalitions 
of groups and individuals. These operated in a largely ‘bottom-up’ manner, 
through horizontal rather than vertical controls.  This is expressed in the box 
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here, where the ‘spontaneous’ 
element of organisation comes 
across clearly from the 
statements of Mirta and Juliana, 
two NO movement activists.  
The corollary of this was that 
actors in the network operated 
with very little financial backing 
and generally had to raise their 
own funds, and get their own messages across. The NO campaign would 
largely be based on the voluntary time and voluntary participation of people 
from across social and classes and from different backgrounds.   
Diversity is to be expected in a loosely connected, decentralized 
movement like the anti-CAFTA NO movement. During the Referendum 
campaign, strong elements of experimentation, and a distinct multiplicity of 
strategies and expressions emerged from within this movement, contrasting 
noticeably with the relative tidiness, homogeneity and centralization of the 
YES campaign and its messages and strategies.  Whilst the NO movement 
stressed ‘personal’ commitment from those involved, and focused on current 
and concrete events, the YES campaign was more impersonal, and more often 
referred to distant threats.  The NO campaign had strong elements of 
physicality and positive emotional appeal, elements which are common to 
many contemporary global movements (MacDonald, 2006: 85-86). The 
contrast with the ‘politics of fear’, and the ‘stomach politics’ orientation of 
YES campaigning, is striking. 
Other significant elements in the NO movement’s networked approach to 
campaigning were its emphasis on creativity and artistic production, often, 
again, without central guidance or uniformity. The use of humour as a political 
strategy was widespread. Resistance to CAFTA became a creative act, about 
promoting forms of popular 
‘counter-power’, and expressing 
ideas in ways that would genuinely 
appeal to people’s sense of 
enjoyment as well as their rational 
self-interest (Smith et al, 2008:98). 
Words like ‘passion’ convey this 
sense of being in the campaign for 
belief and pleasure, as well as for a 
material purposes. Campaign messages tended to represent the NO movement 
as positive and attractive, contrasting this with a centrally-controlled, deceptive 
and fear-mongering YES campaign. The freedom to develop collective and 
individual initiatives and forms of expression, lent a colourful and fluid flavour 
to the NO campaign, moving it beyond the more conventional political 
campaigning methods still used by the YES campaign.  
Uniform slogans and posters, standard party lines and oft-repeated 
dogmas thus dissolved into a ‘pluriformity’ of inter-connected and multi-focal 
messages, directed at different micro-audiences among the electorate. Once 
again, such decentralized coherence is relatively widely observed among 
contemporary social movements in terms of how they operate during 
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campaigns and shared actions (McDonald, 2006: 86; Tilly, 2004). Their mix of 
creativity, enjoyment and physicality makes such movements ‘subversive’ in 
that they difficult to steer and predict.  This makes them hard to control and to 
confront, because of their multiplicity (Interviews with Vilma and Carmen). 
5.2 Key NO messages in the Referendum campaign 
The communicative proposals and messages of the NO movement’s anti-
CAFTA campaign during the Referendum were almost as diverse as the 
participants and groups involved. Each ‘problematic’ issue related to CAFTA 
(some were mentioned in Section 3) was read and commented on from 
multiple viewpoints. Trade unionists, feminists, environmentalists, campesinos 
(poor peasants and farmers), university students, indigenous groups, faith-
based organizations, and others had their own perspectives on issues of trade, 
employment, and a range of economic, social and environmental rights. It is 
impossible in this single study to address all these creative messages. Instead a 
number of general groups of messages that arose during the campaign were 
selected, which are taken as somehow typical of the wider sets of common 
messages and understandings emerging from the NO movement during the 
CAFTA Referendum period. The following statement brings these many types 
of messages of the NO campaign under a single ‘umbrella’:  
NO-CAFTA is a movement built from the confluence of certain basic, shared 
aspirations.  In general, we want a sovereign country, which can integrate into the 
world in new and more just and equitable ways. We claim equality and equity. We 
have the conviction that health, education, water, housing, recreation and a clean 
and healthy environment must, without doubt, be treated as universal rights. We 
claim democracy as a daily experience involving effective participation, and not 
an empty mask or ritual. And it seems very probable that we should think of our 
relationship with nature in totally novel ways, where we recognize ourselves as a 
part of this universe and not as its owners and plunderers (Vargas Solís, 2007:39). 
In the above quotation, the NO campaign is portrayed as a set of nationalist 
efforts to defend the next generation’s right to inherit the gains of previous 
generations. Broad discourses, like defense of the environment, along with the 
assertion of national sovereignty and defense of social institutions, were 
historically built under the Estado Social de Derecho (which can be loosely 
translated as the social, law-based state). The welfare state and mixed economy 
are viewed as central to a law-based, democratic public political life. Social 
institutions – within this understanding– are a ‘collective’ achievement, linked 
to national identity and the heritage of all citizens, as in the following 
quotation: 13 
                                                 
13 Collective mobilizations of the citizens in the second half of XX century were key 
aspects for building and shaping the social institutions of the welfare state.  In this way 
there is a strong identification with those institutions, feeling that is shared and has 
been transmitted to new generations (Alvarenga Venutolo, 2005). 
  41
We will defeat our historical conquerors; we will impede the privatization of the 
services of ICE, INS and AyA, as well as the dismantling of the CCSS14. We act 
in defense of our campesinos, of our flora and fauna, of our cultural identity…with 
the defeat of CAFTA our people will conserve La Patria for our children and will 
integrally preserve their own capacity to decide their fate, their capacity to 
manage themselves, for themselves and forever, those non-transferable 
inheritances that make up our independence and our sovereignty (Movimiento 
Patriótico NO al TLC, 2007). 
What this clearly shows is how political participation was exercised in order to 
defend other rights and was inseparably linked to notions of national Costa 
Rican national citizenship. Nationalist discourse (e.g. defense of the Patria) was 
one way the NO movement shaped its messages, portraying the NO vote as a 
struggle to defend Costa Rican people’s identities and interests from outside 
attack and internal betrayal.  This confluence of ideas was expressed in the 
widespread use of national symbols, references to national myths and to heroic 
historical figures. The NO movement’s representational imaginary was solidly 
rooted in the mythical past of the nation, and referred to key moments in this 
history, when Costa Ricans defended their sovereignty in earlier times. The 
historical characters, ‘Juanito’ Mora and Juan Santamaría, played an important 
role in the 1856 war, and were highlighted as examples of previous resistance 
where Costa Ricans defended themselves (and other Central Americans) 
against US invasion and the nation’s enemies. The NO movement thus 
presented itself as defending a proud historical tradition of protecting the 
nation from combined foreign encroachment and domestic treachery.  
Not all NO movement supporters were happy about these ‘patriotic’ 
emotional appeals, and some objected that sentimental nationalism was not 
what was needed. This could also exclude some potential NO voters. What 
was implied was an idealization of the Costa Rican past, and an uncritical 
celebration of a historical national model that glossed over the marked 
inequalities and exclusions, for example, of indigenous people, women and 
migrants, for example. One interviewee expressed his concern that: ‘Not even 
on behalf of the best possible causes, is it a good idea to idealize historical 
moments and actors’ (interview Carlos).  
These kinds of concerns were not very widespread, however, and in 
general the NO movement was characterised by such different points of view 
on most issues. The sheer plethora of imagery and practices defied any 
prospects of ‘branding’ the movement or campaigning through a centralised 
plan.  Shared practices were marked by considerable variation in form.  The 
NO movement was faced with a government that lacked legitimacy, and 
perhaps for this reason sought to recover elements of ‘national’ political 
ideology to lend greater legitimacy to its own political struggle against CAFTA. 
It is hard to imagine how any ‘non-national’ campaign could have mobilised so 
many supporters for the NO position.  Accusations of working against the 
common interest of Costa Ricans could also more easily be deflected through 
                                                 
14 They are referring to social institutions: ICE (electricity and telecommunications), 
INS (insurances), AyA (water services) and CCSS (health care and social protection). 
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appeal to national symbols and history.  Of course, each side claimed to be 
‘defending the nation’, and the result was that there were areas of overlap and 
competition between the YES and NO campaigns, around a number of key 
national symbols.  
The nationalistic discourse helped provide unity to a hugely range of very 
diverse organisations and participants in the movement campaigning for a NO 
vote. Nationalist discourses used by the NO movement were rooted in the idea 
of Costa Rican exceptionalism, whereas the nationalism of the YES campaign 
was more abstracted from the specifically mixed, or socio-democratic model of 
Costa Rican society (Sandoval García, 2007). Nationalism thus remained the 
‘meeting point’ for very diverse citizen (and non-citizen) groups.  But by 
allowing for greater potential 
diversity in the definition of the 
national, the NO movement was 
perhaps helping reconstruct the 
Costa Rican national imaginary in 
more inclusive ways.  The 
contributions of migrants, 
indigenous people, women and 
even the natural environment 
were all included in this national discourse.   Through its campaigns and use of 
symbols, the NO movement allowed for diversity and thus started (re)building 
more inclusive ways of ‘being Costa Rican’.  Different identities, thoughts and 
voices could be accepted as part of this more inclusive idea of the national 
society, and given recognition.   
The powerful ‘diversity in unity’ approach that emerged can be explained 
symbolically through the ‘NO heart’ logo process, in which symbols that were 
related, but distinct, started to emerge and were widely used during the 
campaign.  This process is more fully explored in Section 5.5. The NO heart 
became perhaps the single most important shared image of the anti-CAFTA 
campaign, its diverse forms powerfully symbolizing the ‘colourful’ coalitions 
that were loosely constructed into the NO movement during the Referendum 
campaign.  An appeal to one of the most basic human emotions, ‘love’, 
produced variations on the theme of Costa Rican identity and voting NO. 
Across different interest groups, classes and social identities, the NO 
movement promoted the sharing of common values of solidarity. Just as the 
component parts of the NO movement shared various versions of the ‘NO 
heart’, they also shared a certain broad vision of development, involving 
gender and social justice and a respect for nature.    
More generally, the struggle against CAFTA membership was framed by 
the NO movement in terms of the need to uphold ethical values and social 
justice, solidarity rather than competitiveness, and the value of human beings 
versus the value of money alone.  The NO movement referendum campaign 
style involved a range of different kinds of persuasive, open argumentation that 
might be described as ‘constructed dialogues’. Developed in countless 
organizational spaces, these included debates in local meetings, open and 
closed conferences, workshops, forums, home visits, fund-raising events.  All 
these were closely observed during fieldwork, and many such ‘constructed 
dialogues’ found their way also into alternative media spaces of the movement, 
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providing the informational basis for the NO campaign. To facilitate 
communication among its component parts and among members, the NO 
movement made extensive use of ‘free’ or low-cost media and internet spaces.  
The way the NO movement tried to construct its campaigning arguments 
is illustrated by a rare example of a funded advertisement taken out in the 
mainstream press. The 8-page document was featured in El Diario Extra, a 
national paper, and was paid for by voluntary contributions from NO 
movement members. It took the form of a ‘pullout’ section combining text 
and illustrations, and containing a range of arguments and ‘facts’, all presented 
in an attractive and user-friendly style to encourage debate.  Arguments made 
were supported by data and references to specific articles of CAFTA.  Basic 
‘factual’ information on CAFTA was presented, as well as sections expressing 
opinions and giving advice.  The document tried to spell out in clear terms the 
major likely implications of CAFTA for a whole range of issues and sectors, 
including everything from the environment and health to intellectual property 
rights, industrial investment and employment, agriculture, public services, 
social security, national insurance, education, telecommunications, trade, 
weapons and the arms trade.   
This extended campaign advert was put together by a group of academics 
and professionals, all committed to the NO campaign, who voluntarily 
contributed the content and designed the layout of the document themselves 
(Albán et al, 2007).  Funds were raised by the movement specifically for the 
purpose of paying for the ‘special advertising feature’.  Through placing such 
arguments and information in the mainstream press, the NO movement hoped 
to overcome its invisibility in the mainstream media. The concern was to get 
vital information across to a wider public audience and to encourage genuine 
debate, as well as to get the NO arguments across.  Using a commercial 
newspaper in this way, enabled the NO campaign to push its message beyond 
those who were already core supporters and members. The goal was to enable 
voters to make sense of the key issues around CAFTA, and so to take a 
position during the Referendum. Private voluntary contributions thus had to 
be mobilised by the NO movement in order for the right to public expression, 
information and meaningful political participation to be exercised and realised. 
In many ways, the NO movement, even whilst it was geared around 
campaigning against CAFTA, remained a social movement. It never became 
just a campaigning organisation. The NO movement firmly located the struggle 
against CAFTA within broader regional and historical struggles. The NO 
movement also continued to ask questions at a fundamental level about what 
kind of development was needed for Costa Rica and its citizens. It was 
concerned with national political life, and with its ethical basis. CAFTA was 
viewed as another step – albeit a very important one - in the long history of 
imposed forms of development and politics.  Its negative economic, social and 
political consequences were a matter of concern, not only for Costa Ricans, but 
for the wider region and for the natural environment. 
The anti-CAFTA campaign was thus presented as part of much broader 
and longer historical and regional struggles against vertical and exclusionary 
ways of exerting authority and usurping authority. The critical social 
movements and organizations involved in NO campaigning each brought their 
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own perspectives on neoliberal globalization, from the perspective of trade 
unions, women’s organisations, students’ groups and indigenous people’s 
organizations, environmental networks, academics and campesinos’ 
organizations, gay and lesbian groups and migrants’ organisations. Many had 
mobilized for years against the implementation of the neoliberal model.  
NO movement activists thus expressed their long-standing indignation at 
historical injustices over decades, perhaps centuries. They did this in both legal-
rational and more creative ways, through formal and informal, organizational 
and media instruments.  Their campaigning messages reminded those 
‘listening’ that historical colonialism and imperialism continued to underpin 
present social and political economic strategies.  They predicted CAFTA would 
worsen historically inherited inequalities, and hoped to harness the indignation 
of Costa Ricans around a politics of hope and solidarity (Hintjens, 2006b). 
A constant message in the campaign was that change was possible through 
concerted citizen actions (pre-figuring the Obama ‘Yes we can’!). This positive 
message from NO movement campaigners was also to counteract disillusion 
among voters, who, whilst they disagreed with CAFTA, felt they could do 
nothing much about it. This ‘fatalism’ was analysed by Ignacio Dobles, a 
psychologist and NO movement activist (Dobles Oropeza citing Martin Baro, 
2007).  In his view, this kind of conformism and resignation tended to 
reinforce existing dominant power structures. In contrast, the NO movement 
sought to offer Costa Rican citizens the sense they could do something to 
change the future by voting, and voting NO. An example of this hopeful 
campaigning style follows: 
Our people will vote NO in the Referendum saying NO to the lies, NO to the 
submissiveness, NO to the corruption, NO to the politiquería (politicking), NO to 
neoliberalism, NO to the handover of seas, beaches, forests and strategic 
institutions, NO to the destruction of those generating the national wealth 
(Movimiento Patriótico NO al TLC, 2007). 
According to this vision, only a more democratic state-society social contract 
could guarantee the basic rights of all, and especially of the most vulnerable 
and historically disadvantaged, as well as protection of the environment.  
Within civil society, daily human relationships were in need of a ‘politics of 
care’, as was the relationship between humans and the natural environment, 
including living creatures and plants. Opposition to CAFTA was associated 
with more caring ways of doing politics, of working, of living with others, and 
of being on the planet.  Overall, conditions seemed promising for the more 
inclusive and participatory approach being promoted by the NO movement.  
Moreover, most elected and appointed political representatives in Costa Rica 
had already lost much of their legitimacy among the voters (Lehoucq, 2005).   
By taking part in the Referendum process, the NO movement implicitly 
acknowledged the rules of the existing, narrowly defined, electoral political 
game. Putting forward alternative visions of social life, however, it went 
beyond liberal democratic definitions of what could be achieved.  It may even 
have become too broad in its focus, and thus failed to deal with some of the 
vital strategic issues in the campaign.  Yet to spend its energy on countering 
the arguments of the YES campaign, would have hampered the NO campaign 
in other ways. It might even have foreclosed the possibility of a wealth of 
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different spaces opening up and the novel, creative and more understandable 
modes of communication that arose so that the NO movement could 
effectively get its wider message(s) across to the Costa Rican voting public.   
5.3 People’s organizational spaces in the campaign   
In this section we look at a key organizational innovation of the NO-CAFTA 
movement during the Referendum campaign, the Patriotic Committees. These 
local autonomously networked campaign organisations are considered in the 
wider context of the loosely central coordinated strategies and institutions of 
the NO movement as a whole. The next and final sub-section will deal with 
the innovative forms and content of communication through NO movement 
internet and websites. 
5.3.1 Patriotic Committees: key actors in the NO campaign 
The many local initiatives and many forms of ‘participatory’ or popular power 
that started to emerge and join forces were the most important quality of the 
NO campaign, which substantiates the claim that this was a movement. These 
associations and networks spread from inter-linked local organizations and 
individual initiatives to form more coordinated campaigns and inter-
organisational networks capable of campaigning and loosely coordinating.  
However, the web of inter-institutional connections that emerged outpaced the 
capacity of any central organization to coordinate them.  To ensure some level 
of coordination, the proliferating local network of the NO movement were 
organised within Patriotic Committees, which sprung up and were established 
in every part of the country.  They mostly involved neighbours associating 
themselves with the NO campaign during the Referendum and getting 
together to discuss tactics and strategies for the campaign.  
As one NO campaigner put it, Patriotic Committees ‘popped up like 
fungi’ (Informal conversation with Rudin). That is to say, they emerged very 
rapidly, but also in a decentralized way, and appeared as a fully-formed set of 
organisational spaces before anyone had really noticed their significance. This 
self-seeding, ‘mushroom-like’ quality of Patriotic Committees was one reason 
the central bodies of the NO campaign were not able to coordinate local 
networks of organizations in any meaningful way.  Indeed, one of the major 
innovations of the NO movement was how these autonomously coordinated 
Patriotic Committees operated as decision-making bodies and fund-raising 
bodies.  Being involved in the Patriotic Committee was also something most 
NO campaigners valued highly. For all these reasons, the Patriotic Committees 
merit closer attention.  
Each Patriotic Committee seems to have emerged to carry out a specific 
set of tasks, and to have worked with significant autonomy from central 
movement control. They were considered privileged spaces for citizens’ on-
going, active discussion and participation, and positively viewed by most 
interviewees.  Those active in campaigning now had a way to meet on a regular 
basis in a highly informal way.  Generally, it seemed those in the Committees 
worked hard to democratize the whole CAFTA debate, by bringing up 
concerns and ideas from ‘below’.  Patriotic Committees were a people’s 
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initiative, and this may be why and how they were able to expand so rapidly 
horizontally, through links with one another.  Patriotic Committees could be 
effective by combining local skills, contacts and resources.   
When fieldwork took place in Costa Rica in mid-August 2007, it was 
estimated that there were at least a hundred Patriotic Committees in the 
country.  More may have existed, but member of the NO movement made 
similar estimates based on their own contacts and experience (Interviews with 
Juliana and Ericka). No survey had been conducted at the time. What emerged 
was that the central coordinating organization of the NO movement and anti-
CAFTA Referendum campaign gradually became aware of the Patriotic 
Committees, and started to realize, as news and messages came in, day-by-day, 
what an important role they were playing in the overall NO campaign. Patriotic 
Committees continued to appear in new places as campaigning continued, and 
even as the Referendum date approached.  
But the Patriotic Committees in another sense were not ‘like mushrooms’, 
since they did not arise out of ‘nothing’, but were built around pre-existing 
social networks, contacts and mobilisation efforts by social organizations and 
movements. What happened during the CAFTA Referendum campaign was 
that existing resources and people were being put to specific use to campaign 
for a NO vote, and this was done in line with the territorial logic of the 
electoral process (Interview with Alberto). Efforts by Patriotic Committees 
were articulated with, and took place alongside all kinds of other, pre-
established social organizations, which continued to conduct a range of other 
kinds of individual and group actions. Patriotic Committees included people 
from local government, from social and academic organizations, trade unions, 
NGOs and community groups, for example, who shared an interest in a NO 
vote from different perspectives (Interview with Martín).  
Beyond previously mobilised individuals, Patriotic Committee 
membership included people outside established anti-CAFTA networks and 
campaigners. New members came from different backgrounds, including more 
women, more working class and poor people, migrant and indigenous groups, 
and younger people who had not been actively involved before (Interview with 
Manuel). Patriotic Committees raised much-needed financial support for the 
NO campaign process, to pay for posters, advertising materials and other 
publicity. Members sold food, organized artistic events such as concerts and 
fairs, and played an active role in creating dialogue and debate, by creating, 
reproducing and distributing materials (e.g. photocopies of articles, custom-
made stickers, CDs, T-shirts, videos, posters and other symbolic and 
informational materials to support a NO vote).   
Interviewing one person involved in a Patriotic Committee, it emerged 
that an important quality of his own Committee, and perhaps of many of these 
local bodies, was to promote dialogue and critical debate within local 
communities around strategic and campaigning issues (Interview with Ciska). 
Meetings and events of all kinds, including cultural events, were organized in a 
wide range of venues, including people’s homes, the streets, community 
centres, church and town halls.  Within the locality-based and interest-based 
meetings, new alliances were produced through logistical, cultural and social 
encounters within the spaces which Patriotic Committees had created.  This 
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resulted in sets of alliances that brought more seasoned anti-CAFTA 
organizers together with new campaign supporters and less campaign-oriented 
community-based organizations.  Several interviewees reported how important 
this sense of ‘encounter’ was.  It was noted during fieldwork, that these kinds 
of inter-connections were a significant feature of the Patriotic Committees.  
With strong roots in the educational and academic sector, it was perhaps 
no coincidence that critical pedagogy was central to the whole way of working 
of these Committees.  ‘Knowledge workers’ tend to ‘spend their lives seeking 
to inspire students of all ages with the desire to learn’, and teachers and other 
educators and researchers can be useful to political campaigns for their ability 
to explain and convey a set of arguments about a complex issue (quotations 
from George, 2004: 200). Such ‘translators’ and educators were very active in 
the Patriotic Committees, and their academic work and research were critical in 
‘translating’ the complexity of the CAFTA agreement into terms that ordinary 
Costa Ricans could more easily understand. It was critical to dispense with 
jargon in order to relate CAFTA to people’s daily experiences.   
The anti-CAFTA case was reinforced during the Referendum campaign by 
a wide range of educational materials, written and published as ‘popular’ issue-
based texts for wide public circulation. This crucial aspect of campaigning 
involved many people inside the Popular Committees in writing, reading and 
commenting on such materials as part of their wider dissemination. As we have 
shown, disinformation around CAFTA in the mainstream media resulted in the 
trivialization of important issues.  This situation obliged committed educators 
and academics, and others involved in social organizations, to become 
‘interlocutors’ between the technical language of CAFTA, the confusing 
rhetoric of politicians and the media, and a set of publics that needed clear, 
relevant information to which it could relate.  In this way, Patriotic 
Committees continued the work of the anti-CAFTA movement historically, in 
clarifying key issues of concern in the neo-liberal project.  As meeting points 
between ‘organic’ and formally educated intellectuals, Patriotic Committees 
became places where anti-CAFTA messages could be devised and 
disseminated.  Their role in this respect was highly supportive of Costa Rican 
citizens’ rights to engage in informed political participation.   
During fieldwork, Rudin was able to observe a meeting organized by one 
Patriotic Committee in a small community, a meeting which involved debating 
environmental issues. The dynamics of the meeting were highly interactive, and 
many critical views were expressed, resulting in a discussion that lively and 
included many critical questions from those present. The meeting was attended 
by activists from a range of different organizations and participants not only 
‘got’ information from the main speakers, but also shared their own knowledge 
with one another. They expressed doubts, put forward different points of view, 
and linked topics of conversation with their own experiences. This debating 
seemed to produce a tangible sense of encouragement for themselves and for 
one another. At one point a campesino stood up to tell those present about his 
knowledge of transgenic crops. He was able to explain the problem from 
experience but also made reference to farmers’ experiences in other countries, 
having been involved in global networks of farmers’ associations.  Such 
debates, being issue-focused rather than political party-based, helped forge 
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alliances and build bridges among local people who might have voted YES 
vote, or might not have bothered voting at all. 
In the same Patriotic Committee meeting, it was interesting to see how 
open conflict and disagreements arose. Some issues aroused a lot of interest, so 
that everybody wanted to talk at once. Responses and the reactions to 
statements and questions suggested that many people present had invested 
emotionally in the issues discussed. Organisers and participants alike repeatedly 
expressed their frustration that mainstream news, especially on television, 
could not be trusted. At the same time the lack of interest in the community, 
especially among those who could be considered members of the broader anti-
CAFTA movement, was also bemoaned.  Everyone agreed about the urgency 
of citizens getting actively involved in the NO campaign, taking part in debate, 
and also voting in the Referendum, thus exercising their right to influence the 
political process in several ways. This was seen as each citizen’s duty, given that 
decisions about CAFTA would inevitably affect everyone. 
Patriotic Committees, built up from below, acted as the key organizational 
and deliberative spaces for the NO movement during the campaign. On the 
one hand, they played a role in solving concrete problems – by raising funds, 
getting support and providing publicity through events. On the other hand, the 
Patriotic Committees oversaw the voting process on Referendum Day to 
ensure that it was fair.  More generally, these Committees acted in ways that 
helped generate common understandings and shared meanings among NO 
supporters, around CAFTA and its impact.  The Committees opened up new 
venues for the campaign, allowing relatively uninhibited and uncensored 
debate (according to observation and interviews).  Dissent did not appear to be 
suppressed, at least in the Committee attended, and according to informants.  
Views could be expressed in an atmosphere of relative trust and openness, and 
this often resulted in consensus-building around key issues, and living with 
considerable disagreement around less important issues.  The key questions 
concerned a positive model of development for Costa Rica, the defence of 
citizens’ basic rights and how politics could be made more democratic. 
There may be longer-term lessons for the anti-CAFTA movement from 
how shared meanings and ‘frames’ were constructed in Patriotic Committees 
across the country during the Referendum campaign.  This process deserves 
further study, but can not be discussed fully here.  Patriotic Committees are 
best viewed as organisational spaces where more active forms of citizenship 
and political participation could be enabled and promoted during the CAFTA 
Referendum campaign. Most interviewees confirmed that these committees 
emerged only in the context of the Referendum on CAFTA membership. But 
changes brought in by the Patriotic Committees have the potential to influence 
political processes in the longer term (see Box 5.1). The way Patriotic 
Committees worked in practice may even have the potential to help restore 
citizens’ confidence in their own capacity to make a difference.  
It was clear from participants and movement actors’ comments that 
Patriotic Committees are seen by most people as one of the most successful 
organizational innovations of the entire NO campaign, which is why we have 
considered them in such detail. 
  49
 
 
5.3.2 The question of central coordination 
Efforts to coordinate the NO movement, and before that the anti-CAFTA 
movement, by encouraging cooperation among its constituent parts, began 
almost a decade ago. The NO movement organized itself through networks 
inhabited by diverse individuals and by collective forms of organizational 
leadership (Vargas Solís, 2007). The Referendum – as a single, specific moment 
in time – did however require the creation of some central strategies and basic 
common understandings so that the NO campaign could enjoy some sense of 
overall coherence, pace and direction. Without coordination, it was feared the 
movement might be ‘divided and conquered’.  Some over-arching vision, 
however loosely defined, was needed to avoid internal conflicts becoming 
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destructive.  Internal conflicts are to social movements what Susan George has 
aptly called the ‘the circular firing squad’, in which internal factional squabbles 
can cause the movement’s own defeat (George, 2004).  If broad principles are 
clarified and widely shared through some central point, then this can perhaps 
reduce the ability of personal ambitions to cause division by hiding behind 
lofty-sounded concerns. 
During the Referendum campaign, a central facilitative committee, the 
‘Comité Operativo Político Facilitador’ (COPF) for the NO campaign was created, 
along with some working sub-committees (organization, communications and 
finance). Their role was to intended to be to coordinate the campaign and 
ensure its constituent parts would have some basic level of coherence in terms 
of the main messages, organizational forms and communication channels used 
to get messages across.  But COPF was not expected to run the NO campaign 
‘from the centre’ or provide it with resources; rather it was the central node in 
a network of other existing, pre-formed networks that made up the NO 
movement’s infrastructure. All the main organizations, social sectors and 
political parties in the NO campaign had a representative in the COPF. This 
committee – as its name suggests – thus provided a strategically located space 
for coordination, rather than a site from which the movement could be 
steered. COPF and its sub-committees sought to coordinate efforts during the 
campaign, including in the use of existing alliances, skills and resources.   
According to some interviewees, however, COPF was split by inter-
personal conflicts from the start, and it soon became difficult to reach 
agreement because of widely contrasting visions and resulting power tussles 
among COPF representatives. Some of these differences arose from the 
recurrent debate between reformers and revolutionaries, which divides many 
social movements (De Souza Santos, 2006). Such perennial tensions are 
unlikely to be resolved, and perhaps the only appropriate response is, as Susan 
George again advises, to take a democratic approach, which recognises: “We’ve 
got variety and we should glory in it” (George, 2004: 98). Seeking ‘consensus’ 
requires more centralized and authoritarian form of coordination than social 
movements can generally sustain, especially where – as with the NO 
movement – they lack financial resources. 
A reformist-revolutionary tension emerged within COPF at the start of 
the CAFTA Referendum process, and was expressed as disagreement over 
whether Costa Ricans should take part in the Referendum at all.  For some, 
whose distrust in institutionally state-sanctioned spaces of political 
participation was profound, a boycott of the entire Referendum process was 
the best option. But most of those in social organizations tended to agree that 
participation in the Referendum was as vital as participation in the anti-
CAFTA movement.  By boycotting the Referendum – they insisted – the 
movement would simply remove any chance of influencing CAFTA-related 
processes in future, whatever the outcome of the Referendum. Initial polemics 
around participation or boycott were resolved as movement participants agreed 
generally that everyone should take part in the vote.  Some stressed that 
participation should be conditional on guarantees that the electoral process was 
to be fairly conducted.  But although such claims were made, as we saw in 
Section 4, there was no official acknowledgement that proper procedures and 
democratic rules and practices had not been followed. Claims about bias were 
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not accepted by the key state institutions, and only the TSE – towards the end 
of the campaign – even recognised the mainstream media bias for a YES vote, 
during the Referendum campaign (see Section 4). 
At the early stages, anti-CAFTA movement leaders were not prepared to 
recommend participation in an electoral process where the rules of the game 
looked rigged.  Much of the anti-CAFTA movement’s historical experience in 
social organizing was through strategies of street and community mobilizations 
rather than through taking part in more conventional forms of political 
participation, for example through voting in elections or through using legal 
means to contest official procedures (Alvarenga, 2005).  Interviewees gave 
some examples of how manipulation and factionalism (especially between 
reformers and radicals) divided the meetings of COPF, complicating decision-
making. When such examples were brought forward, it was usually to illustrate 
how movement leaders tended to reproduce the same dynamics of power, 
personal control, manipulation and exclusion they opposed when they arose 
outside the movement.  But the disagreements did not disrupt the movement, 
or even seem to have that much importance. Disputes among those in COPF, 
aroused humour and irony among interviewees, rather than anger or concern.  
This is not to dismiss the importance of such schisms, which could have 
serious consequences.  As one seasoned anti-CAFTA activist pointed out, 
these: ‘*(p)ersonal rivalries, selfishness and factional power politics... (and) the 
refusal to compromise’ could be turned to the advantage of the YES campaign. 
During fieldwork it did not prove possible to observe the inner workings of 
COPF.  Based on interviews conducted, and on other materials obtained, it 
seemed that by the time of fieldwork in August 2007, the central coordination 
committee seemed to be playing a minor, but supportive role facilitating the 
unity of the NO movement for the purposes of the Referendum.  This was just 
two months before the referendum election.  
COPF faced significant obstacles to its coordination role. The sheer 
diversity of the NO movement’s various organizations and participants, as well 
as the quite significant external obstacles to getting the NO message across in 
the media, were two of the most significant of these.  The lack of economic 
resources and time, and the purely voluntary organization of the NO 
campaign, were all constraints that limited what COPF (and the NO 
movement) could manage.  Yet in spite of all these obstacles, COPF continued 
to do its job, and was certainly part of the overall process of campaigning.  On 
the other hand, it was evident from some comments, that the Popular 
Committees, and not COPF, were seen as the driving force and source of 
mobilising energy of the NO movement. 
5.4 The Internet as campaign media 
Alongside the movement’s use of nationalist language and imagery, and the 
work of the Patriotic Committees, the final pillar of the NO campaign was the 
extensive and at times highly original use of internet networks and websites.  
The use of the internet can even be seen as metaphor for the whole 
‘networked’ structure of the NO-CAFTA movement and Referendum 
campaign process.  The web and internet are suited to peer-to-peer and 
community-to-community communication, are network-based and are 
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characterized by high levels of dispersion, diversity, participation. The internet 
and web’s qualities thus match those of social movements in many ways 
(Carolina Flores in Boza & Rojas, 2007b; Corrales Retana, 2007; Vargas Solís, 
2007).   
The sheer amount of information available through the NO movement’s 
internet sites was impressive, both in terms of the volume of communications 
and in the diverse graphic and written forms of creative expressions circulated 
through a wide range of different web and internet spaces. It was impossible to 
review this information in its generality.  The communications themselves 
included tailor-made and adapted website pages, on-going themed blogs, email 
circulation lists, posted videos placed on sites like youtube and downloadable 
materials to produce (and design) posters, badges, leaflets, T-shirts and the like. 
The volume and quality of these communications was impressive, and should 
be the subject of other studies in future. Here we will focus on just a few 
examples of campaign communications, which have been chosen to illustrate 
how political participation as a right of citizens was expressed and exercised.   
Widespread use of computer and internet technology by those organizing 
and participating in the NO campaign was possible because of the rapidly 
increasing skills level of the Costa Rican population. In recent years, the 
accessibility of internet and web-based technology and information has 
improved rapidly.15  On the other hand, the Internet became unusually 
important as a tool of communication for the NO movement.  This was the 
first time that alternative media had been used systematically to overcome the 
disadvantages the NO movement and campaign faced in accessing mainstream 
media outlets.  The movement’s lack of financial resources were no obstacle, as 
much of the communication is free.  Even so, NO campaign visions and 
images were still notably less visible in public during the Referendum period 
than the huge, loud YES messages.  Given the need to by-pass conventional 
media reporting, internet became the preferred site for distributing NO 
campaign materials and ideas among the population during the campaign 
(Verduzco and Zúñiga in Boza & Rojas, 2007b). Internet and the web are 
widely assumed to be integral to a new ‘space of flows’, as identified by Manuel 
Castells (Castells, 2005). This 
vision is expressed in the text 
box in which Carmen expresses 
the belief that such spaces help 
open up completely new 
possibilities for organising and 
new kinds of power for social 
movements.  Greater freedom 
of expression and freedom of 
access to information are seen as 
                                                 
15 From one year to another the connections to houses increase from 90 to 150 
thousands, without counting Internet cafes.  Around 25% of the population have 
access to the Internet, which is considered a privileged situation in comparison with 
other countries in the region (Radiográfica Costarricense S.A., 2006). 
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possible, especially with open-access web and internet technologies.  Moreover, 
the uncontrollability of communication enhances, rather than reduces, the 
usefulness of internet-based campaign communications for a decentralised 
social movement like the NO CAFTA movement. Internet-generated messages 
can be used and adapted by all kinds of different sub-groups involved in 
campaigning. This means that an actor-oriented set of political messages can be 
disseminated through variations on a theme, and adapted to specific audiences 
and interest-groups as the need arises.  This works by producing a message 
both diverse and unified. How this expresses a more democratic ideal became 
clear during the electoral campaign of Barack Obama, more recently, in the US, 
when web and internet communications, often ‘home made’ were seen to play 
a critical role in his electoral success.    
By removing most costs associated with access to radio, television and the 
printed press, web and internet communication brings producers and 
consumers of information together, sometimes in the same person. New 
media: “…process signals that do not originate from any specific place but 
from endless recurrent interactions in the network” (Castells, 2005: 364).  In 
the case of the NO campaign the use of internet served to further democratise 
the messages distributed and permitted their adjustment for specific target 
audiences, who in turn became producers of messages for others in their 
networks. Anti-CAFTA mobilizations prior to 2007 hardly used any internet or 
web communication in their actions. Perhaps significantly, control from the 
centre was much more noticeable during those earlier mobilizations.  Perhaps 
as the role of the ‘centre’ in disseminating information has diminished, so too 
has its capacity to coordinate organisation of the movement, as we saw in the 
case of the COPF.  This capacity seems to have been ‘redistributed’ to a larger 
number of localised and decentralized locations and groups better able to 
produce messages to support the complex NO campaigning process. 
New possibilities of direct, free, fast and uncensored expression of a 
political message in multiple, related forms, have already made internet, web 
and virtual reality preferred, privileged space for anti-FTA campaigns and 
movements across Latin America and Central America. This has now also 
happened in Costa Rica. Experience suggests that campaigning via web and 
internet can also facilitate real-time organizing, as when mobiles or text help 
people to know about mass actions planned shortly in advance.  Financial 
resources can be pooled from a wider network, including through supporters 
from outside the country.  And there is little need for expensive trips abroad.  
Patriotic Committees regularly made use of and posted information on 
free websites and in e-mail circulation lists. This information included texts, 
slogans, symbols and visual images, and could all be reproduced in physical 
handouts, posters, stickers and booklets within a local area.  This cut costs, 
without the need for distribution, printing through a commercial printer and so 
forth.  Such materials could be provided to those with no internet access at 
relatively low-cost, without the need for professional layout work and so on.  
NO movement internet and websites also constituted social spaces where 
different kinds of views and debates and disagreements could be aired. Such 
on-line processes of deliberation and open disagreement also helped create 
common ground.  In the process of constructing shared understandings of 
what was at stake, a sense of community was being constructed and built upon 
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by those who - for all sorts of different and overlapping reasons - supported a 
NO vote – or at least opposed a YES vote.  Solidarities created like this could 
help transcend geographical and identity-based boundaries and create new 
shared perspectives, as well as bringing some YES supporters into the debates 
by rousing their curiosity about what such symbols and messages implied 
(Olesen, 2002, 2005). In other words, to quote Castells again, these: ‘material 
arrangements allow for simultaneity of social practices without territorial 
contiguity’ (Castells, 2005: 364). Complete strangers, people who had never 
met, could form identifications as part of a social group or as part of the 
broader campaign, and work in joined-up ways, as well as within their own 
localities or on their own. This implied cross-spatial reconstruction of elements 
of shared meanings, with the result that spatially and organizationally 
centralized coordination became less important. It was not needed as much, 
and neither was it highly valued or effectively practiced.  The Internet was 
primarily used as a tool for debate, and to exercise rights to access information 
through writing, but also through images and film, and various other forms of 
artistic and creative expression.  These modes of expression became virtual 
spaces in which the democratic deliberations of the NO movement were 
facilitated by immediate and varied forms of response made possible through 
internet and web.   
According to some, perhaps naïve, thinkers and activists, the internet and 
web can be used by social movement like the NO movement in Costa Rica in 
ways that have already changed how we look at politics, and at the news.  The 
profound impacts that social movements’ campaigning are having on broader 
political culture is often pointed out (Zúñiga in Boza & Rojas, 2007b; Olesen, 
2005). As a series of networks, internet and web-based groups are able to 
consolidate more horizontal relationships, thus perhaps diminishing the 
control of vertical relationships at least within social movements themselves. More 
clientelistic modes of political engagement were identifiably associated with the 
YES campaign during the Referendum in Costa Rica, rather than with the NO 
campaign. This was reflected in how much the YES campaign continued to 
involve top-down and conventional, although still very potent, forms of 
political communication. Their impact could be appreciated from the results of 
the Referendum.     
As in the Patriotic Committees, a remarkable diversity of voices could be 
found in the NO movement’s various websites, blogs and e-mail list 
discussions. Debates developed through cross-referencing, helped to raise 
awareness of counter-narratives and challenges from the mainstream media 
and politicians who generally claimed to be representing the ‘objective’ 
‘unbiased’ truth on any specific issue.  An interesting aspect of this process has 
been how it has opened up a style of campaigning and communication that 
recognizes diversity, and can live with conflict.  Such an approach to 
communication recognises that contradictory positions can coexist within a 
single over-arching consensus about the key, shared goals.  The component 
parts of any social movement can retain strong elements of distinctiveness, 
whilst on central issues they can appear to ‘speak with one voice’. A range of 
points of view does not necessarily produce a discordant result, and may imply 
harmony rather than a cacophony of voices.   
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During the NO campaign, some of the interactive practices used in 
websites and blogs created new forms of interaction and reaction that were 
experimented with. This included on-line responses to politicians through e-
mails and web-posts.  Interacting virtually certainly seemed to have got around 
the strictly vertical social relations that are super-imposed on any horizontal 
organizational forms.  One radio programme during the NO campaign 
analysed this process, comparing a largely passive and clientelist model of 
political participation with being available to communicate personal visions, 
enter into open debates and share information in a relatively fearless way, using 
one’s own judgement. One NO movement supporter in this radio program 
described this process as: ‘breaking with ideas of representative democracy in 
which each four years I go and vote and after that I am of no importance [and 
in which]…I cannot change anything’ (Flores in Boza & Rojas, 2007b) (see 
also Annex 7). During the Referendum process, the NO-CAFTA movement 
seems to have been willing to experiment with the possibilities of using ICTs 
to promote more democratic ways of thinking, organizing, and making 
decisions (Smith et al, 2008). 
The NO movement’s messages on the internet were centred on, but not 
confined to, two official websites. For NO movement participants, the range 
of messages that resulted seemed to be experienced not as ‘disorder’ or ‘chaos’, 
but as something welcome. As there was a proliferation of messages and 
websites over time, ‘efficiency’ or coherence might have been lost. But instead, 
from interviews carried out, it seemed to be recognised that more democratic 
forms of direct participation were coming to the fore through coordinated 
direct action and experimentation.  Without any central control system, 
horizontal ‘peer to peer’ 
communities can be in touch 
through internet lists. The 
Referendum campaign 
triggered creative innovations 
in how participants in the anti-
CAFTA movement made use 
of ICTs. Such new practices 
tended to enhance members’ 
feelings of being able to exercise their right to information and to participate 
politically in ways that could resonate with the notion of ‘rights’. Some of those 
interviewed felt this would be one lasting outcome of the NO-CAFTA 
movement and Referendum campaign. 
Olesen (2002) reminds us how: ‘internet displays a potential for 
diminishing not only physical distance but also social and cultural distance’ (p. 
32). The NO movement’s connections in Central and Latin America extended 
to include other organizations working against CAFTA, and among US civil 
society organizations those that campaigned against FTAA.  A wider sense of 
‘community’, beyond national borders, has helped connect the ‘national’ 
struggle against CAFTA with other, related, struggles against neo-liberal 
globalization elsewhere. This reinforced a sense both of uniqueness, and of 
being part of broader global coalitions of resistance to neo-liberalism’s 
agendas, policies and practices (Quesada, 2007). The ‘resonance between the 
everyday lives and experiences’ of people who both send and receive 
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information, is built up, so that people share what they are experiencing and 
thinking, often on a more or less daily basis, implying a sense of ‘moral 
proximity’ that can create a sense of affinity and commitment. 
5.5 Campaign materials: rights, meanings and practices 
The generation of campaign material and financing of the NO campaign for 
the 2007 Costa Rican Referendum were mostly organized in a quite 
participatory, collective and autonomous way. Diverse citizens involved in the 
NO movement constructed and designed campaign materials and publicity 
themselves. For the most part this was done through voluntary efforts.  The 
priority was to mobilise mass support for a NO vote in the Referendum.  The 
movement favoured opening up all sorts of spaces where people could express 
themselves and take part – face to face and on-line – in relatively open debates. 
It became clear that whilst the NO campaign was solidly based in a social 
movement, whose members expressed themselves quite freely, the YES 
campaign was not.  The ICT campaign which emerged in Costa Rica to 
prevent CAFTA being introduced, came to be an example of what Stammers 
refers to as the ‘expressive dimension’ of human rights, involving creative 
struggles around rights, and in this case especially in relation to political 
participation (2005:322). 
The ‘NO’ heart was mentioned earlier in this section – and came to be the 
one of the most powerful symbols of the NO campaign. It emerged from 
among a small group of NO movement supporters, some of whom were 
communication professionals who gave their time to the anti-CAFTA 
movement, and now to the NO movement. The symbol of a heart was posted 
onto the Internet alongside many other images and symbols. It soon became 
the most popular symbol for NO supporters to identify themselves.  It had a 
strong collective resonance, and was appropriated by all sorts of different 
groups and individuals who adapted it by modifying its component parts. The 
NO heart was thus combined and mixed with all sorts of other symbols, 
elements, colours and shapes that represented varying identities and interests 
that formed part of the NO movement. A small sample of the outcome of this 
process is illustrated in Figure 5.1, which shows the original, most general 
version of the heart at the left hand side. 
The national flag can be seen inside the heart, alongside many other 
smaller, global flags that show Costa Ricans are not alone in being against 
agreements like CAFTA. The slogan reads ‘my heart says NO, and yours (what 
does yours say?)’. Next to this are a sample of different small hearts and other 
shapes related to the NO heart. These represent an array of causes and 
organizations, identities and interest groups that make up the complex 
networks of the NO movement. Each symbol represents a movement or social 
group, whose concerns form part of the NO movement.  In the top row, in 
the centre is a modified version of the NO heart, produced in a participatory 
workshop in Guanacaste and modified to represent that region. Below this, 
also in the centre, is another modified version which portrays the NO heart 
from the indigenous Bribris’ perspective. Since they see the liver as the body’s 
centre of feeling and associated with emotions of love, the heart shape has here  
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been replaced with the shape of a liver. This text reads NO-CAFTA in the 
Bribris’ language. On the right are two alternative symbols generated by a 
Costa Rican environmental network, which were both in use during the 
Referendum campaign. In one case, the heart symbol, in which the national 
flag has been removed (below), has been replaced by an alternative symbol of 
the NO movement, a ‘protective’ hand (above).  
These few examples show how the symbol’s uses were adapted to specific 
locations, interest groups and identities, and yet remained more or less 
recognizable through the ‘NO’.  This richly nuanced set of campaigning 
symbols was produced in a decentralized way, with each variation adapted to a 
niche within the NO movement.  The diversity of the symbol’s usages was 
mentioned by interviewees. Some in the NO movement were not that happy 
about the importance the NO heart came to have. Some considered it perhaps 
too sentimental to have wide appeal, but others saw its appeal to the emotions 
as a sign of its strength. 
The heart symbol was popularized and then appropriated by many 
different groups, and even by the YES campaign. It is not clear at what point 
YES campaigners decided to start using the NO heart symbol, but shortly 
afterwards Julia, one of the original creators of the heart logo, denounced this 
in her personal blog. She described it as ‘robbery’ of NO campaigners’ ideas.  
On the other hand, the appropriation of the heart symbols suggests it had 
worked well, and had become a visible expression of the common vision and 
shared values. It was a symbol the YES campaign now sought to reappropriate. 
In other words, the NO heart was so widely visible in Costa Rica that the YES 
campaign could no longer afford to ignore it, and felt it needed to try and 
reappropriate it (Ardón, 2007).  
Julia regretted that the heart logo had not been legally registered or 
copyrighted when it was created. But Silvia, an environmental activist, writing 
in Julia’s blog (see Box 5.2) thinks the NO heart was successful precisely 
because, from the start, it was not copyrighted, and therefore could be freely 
and openly borrowed, changed and used without charge or permission.  Silvia 
compared the NO heart to organic, unpatented seed that does not self-destruct 
but goes on to propagate other seeds. To ‘copyright’ the image and claim 
ownership, suggested Silvia, would be like patenting seeds, and would have 
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prevented the lively variations on the theme. Julia wanted to confine the use of 
the NO heart to the NO campaign, but for Silvia, the NO heart had become a 
form of collective property, a public good that anyone who wished to could 
use, even the YES campaigners (Rodríguez, 2007) (Box 5.2). This blog-based 
debate mirrored much wider concerns over the logic and rules of property 
rights, embodied in CAFTA, and opposed by many in the NO movement who 
favoured shared forms of public provisions, with free services for the poorest.   
Challenging market-based notion of property rights for knowledge, ideas 
and creative productions through the internet and through reproducible, freely 
shared messages and symbols, is part of the original contribution of the NO 
movement to democratizing political practices of citizens in Costa Rica.  
Producing and reproducing documentaries, academic and artistic productions, 
videos, external signs and others, involves democratizing people’s access to 
different forms of knowledge.  Within the NO movement, one organization 
known as of La Casadora16 (Movimiento Cultura Frente al TLC, Cultural Front 
Movement against CAFTA, 2007), for example, explicitly challenged the 
market-based logic of capitalism by labelling all their messages with a ‘copyleft’ 
                                                 
16 ‘Casadora’ was the name given to small popular traditional buses that used to enter 
to different small towns. In the context of the Referendum, La Casadora was an 
initiative of a group of artists that visited different communities throughout the 
country to inform and entertain, promoting a critical perspective on CAFTA.  They 
also generated campaign material like music CDs, for example. 
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logo. This means ‘any person can use, modify and redistribute written 
documents and computer software, as well as works of art and music’ so long 
as they do not make a profit from them. This poses a direct challenge to the 
‘intellectual property rights regime on which the current global capitalist order 
depends, establishing the base for an alternative political and economic system’ 
(Smith et al, 2008:104). 
When it was used, recreated and shared in this way, the generation of 
visual materials – in this case the NO heart – went beyond what might be 
viewed as an instrumental mobilization for the purposes of the referendum. A 
uniform logo would have worked just as well if this was the case, as it would 
have been more instantly recognizable on television or in advertisements. The 
generation of varied campaign messages and symbols, however, became a way 
for participants in the movement to express themselves creatively. By being 
flexibly constructed, the messages also expressed the way the NO movement 
itself created new spaces for inclusion of previously marginalized groups of 
citizens. Different spaces (and different logos) were built to accommodate the 
range of different kinds of perspectives and actors involved.  
Thus whenever a group of people, or an organisation, used the heart logo, 
adapted and amended it, they were playing not only with images, colours and 
texts, but expressing their own identities and interests within, and yet as 
distinctive from the rest of, the NO movement. Modifications of the NO heart 
express the possibilities for overlapping and distinctive spaces which can 
converge on-line for social movements of this kind. Each variant of the NO 
heart expressed a particular kind of anti-CAFTA standpoint, and was supposed 
to mobilise people around a set of recognizable common concerns besides 
CAFTA alone. 
These external signs were popular with movement participants during the 
Referendum campaign. They were both simple to use and adapt, and were 
visible on a daily basis in all aspects of life. As Ciska noted, in an interview, 
these were ‘symbols very close to the people’, and it was observed that most 
NO supporters routinely made use of these symbols as decorations, placing 
them on their clothes or painting them on the walls of their houses. By 
comparison, YES supporters did not make the same use of comparable 
symbols at home, or in offices or workplaces (interviews with Ciska, Martín, 
Rodolfo). A huge Manta de los Sueños (a quilt, literally ‘of dreams’) was 
gradually sewn together during the CAFTA Referendum campaign using pieces 
of cloth on which participants, mainly women, expressed their visions of a 
better life (figure 5.2). During the campaign the ‘manta’ was taken around to 
different communities throughout Costa Rica, and as it travelled it became 
bigger and bigger with each visit. This collective construction also physical 
expresses the way in which the NO movement and campaign was constructed 
through shared – but diverse - values and practices. 
Financially, the NO campaign struggled, and was almost entirely 
dependent on voluntary initiatives by the groups and individuals that formed 
the wider anti-CAFTA movement.  These contributions went towards funding 
publicity, and funding was mainly organized through collective and 
participatory practices, using mechanisms of group accountability and financial  
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transparency to keep high levels of trust. Voluntary economic contributions 
were collected from citizens closely or more loosely connected to the 
movement, and from members of network organizations that had allied 
themselves under the anti-CAFTA umbrella. During the campaign there were 
attempts to centrally manage at least some financial resources; through the Al 
no lo financio YO (I finance the NO) campaign. This scheme allowed those 
willing to contribute money directly into a central fund for common 
expenditures and overall activities. The collection of significant amounts of 
money in a centralized way was something relatively new, and something for 
which the movement was perhaps not very well equipped (Interview with 
Juliana). In general, for all these reasons, the NO campaigns tended to be 
conducted within the constraints of limited resources (Interview with Ciska, 
after the Referendum, looking back on the experience). 
5.6 Inclusions and exclusions 
Before we move on to analyse the implications of the ways the NO movement 
participants claimed and exercised rights, we consider some problems of the 
NO movement, some of its weaknesses, especially as observed by interviewees. 
Several interviewees shared the perception that membership was basically 
middle class.  This was, in the words of one writer, a network that started 
‘from the middle’ (De Souza Santos, 2006). To some extent this opinion was 
confirmed by observations by Rudin during fieldwork in Costa Rica during the 
Referendum campaign. 
Two comments can be made regarding this observation. Firstly, the 
emergence and survival of the middle class in Costa Rica has depended heavily, 
historically speaking, on social institutions that CAFTA was likely to weaken or 
remove. In particular, public institutions like the national telecommunications 
company, electricity, national insurance, health and educational institutions, all 
provided the base for a sizeable Costa Rican middle class.  The middle class 
might find it easier to engage in political participation because of their higher 
Figure 5.2
 
 
La Manta de los Sueños, an initiative of ‘Women against CAFTA’ 
Source: www.notlc.com 
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education levels, and because they had more free time to spend in voluntary 
work. They also enjoyed better material resources, and better access to 
information and technology.  Several interviewees were concerned that the NO 
movement included very few people from among the urban poor, hardly any 
people without formal education and relatively few informal sector workers. 
Some Costa Ricans remained onlookers in debates around CAFTA, apparently 
not interested or feeling engaged. A technology gap between the rich and poor 
may have been a source of exclusion, undermining the positive aspects of 
internet mentioned earlier. In addition to class and education, similar 
exclusions may have operated in the movement’s participants along lines of 
gender, age, citizenship status and identity.   
Concerns were expressed in interviews about the danger of idealizing the 
anti-CAFTA movement and the NO campaign. Persistent inequalities and 
exclusions would have been unavoidable during the anti-CAFTA campaign, 
according to this point of view, not only because of how the NO movement 
operated, but also because the campaign was being conducted in a national and 
regional context in which the past two decades at least had already brought in a 
social and economic structure defined by structural and intensifying patterns of 
segregation.  Social and gender inequalities had tended to deepen with 
neoliberal policies since at least the 1980s. These structural inequalities were 
bound to have their echo in the NO movement and campaign. 
The NO movement made efforts to reach socially marginalized groups in 
Costa Rican society, and encourage some excluded people to inform 
themselves and organize at local levels. The Patriotic Committee meetings and 
activities were a good example of how the anti-CAFTA movement opened up 
to new voices during the Referendum campaign. In some cases, better off 
Patriotic Committees organized support visits to underpin the work of other 
committees struggling in poorer rural and urban areas. Specific efforts were 
made to spread information and generate debate among marginalized groups 
and those living in remote areas. Various NGOs, social organizations within 
the NO movement, and groups of students and academics got involved in 
these kinds of initiatives. These actions of extending contacts across class, 
identity, locational and issue-barriers were widely observed during fieldwork 
and referred to both in interviews and in e-mail news and website postings. 
Throughout the campaign, the generalized and active participation of 
women of different ages, classes and backgrounds, and of young people at all 
levels, was considered one of the most significant positive developments when 
compared with earlier anti-CAFTA campaigns. A distinct problem of 
representativeness was however raised by some interviewees in relation to 
COPF as the central coordinating committee. Almost the same people were in 
all the central coordinating groups and committees, and almost all were middle 
class, mostly highly educated men. Some groups that actively took part in the 
NO campaign were not represented in the central decision-making circles. On 
the other hand, some interviewees thought that not all groups and 
organizations were really that interested in participating in the central spaces of 
the NO movement. Perhaps – it was suggested – they preferred to invest their 
energy in participating in constructing shared solidarities at local level, rather 
than invest it in core activities of a campaign that would not outlast the 
Referendum.   
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Field observations revealed that the contributions some people, especially 
some women, make to the NO movement, do not appear that visible from 
outside. The tendency is for these contributions to be hidden behind the 
gender-specific roles that women are presumed to perform, pushing their 
contribution artificially into the ‘private’ domain. Even though women were 
visible from within the movement, many were not as visible from ‘outside’. For 
example, one woman supporter of the NO movement reported to Rudin how 
during the Referendum campaign period, she took on the job of running the 
family’s small business so that her husband could become a ‘full-time’ 
participant in the local Patriotic Committee. She recognized that it was her 
contribution that ensured that voluntary time and energy could be provided to 
the movement by her husband. Unless she had stepped in, his voluntary work 
would have sacrificed the basic needs of their family. Invisible and indirect 
contributions of this kind are more typical of women than men, and need to be 
recognized and appreciated by social movements alongside the more visible 
work of ‘activists’.  
In conclusion, transforming gender roles, and making women’s 
contributions more visible, remains a challenge for social movements like the 
NO movement as they try to construct more democratic and inclusive forms 
of political participation for citizens. If the burden of the home workload 
continues being mainly over the shoulders of women, they (and especially poor 
women) will have little capacity to participate under equal conditions in public 
spaces where direct debate, decision-making and mobilization are both duties 
and rights. It is now time to review the main findings in light of the central 
questions posed at the start of this working paper.   
6 TOWARDS A SYNTHETIC ANALYSIS 
Through observing the NO movement in late 2007 during the period shortly 
before the Referendum, it became clear that rights to political participation 
were being understood in different ways by various social actors in the NO 
movement.  The research considered how participants in the NO movement 
were able to demand (or claim) and to realize (or exercise) political participation 
rights. Could such rights really be created, or even seized, through the shared 
process of constructing sites or spaces where information, different forms of 
expression and debates could be exchanges by those within the movement?  
Perhaps, bit by bit, certain forms of political participation came to be realized 
in this way, through concrete social practices of those engaged in the NO 
social movement?  We consider the trajectory of the NO movement, and how 
the practices and meanings of political participation rights were connected to 
different aspects of the social movement’s activities during the (formally 
democratic) campaign process prior to the CAFTA Referendum. 
6.1 Placing the NO Movement 
In the context of the Referendum, the NO movement –  we can now see it is 
also a coalition – developed its effort to persuade voters not to go along with 
the YES vote for CAFTA. The YES vote, it claimed, was part of a policy 
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project supported by a deeply-entrenched ‘triangle’ of political, economic and 
media power, which lacked integrity and had lost its political legitimacy. Anti- 
and pro-CAFTA campaigns were engaged in what can be described as a ‘war 
of interpretations’ over what the real electoral issues were (Slater in Alvarez, 
Dagnino y Escobar et al, 1998:7). This was a contest for the ‘hearts and minds’ 
(and stomachs) of voters. On the one side was a hegemonic, dominant and 
officially authorized vision, promoted by most of the Costa Rican political 
elite, the business community and the media, which represented the YES vote. 
On the other side was a diffuse counter-hegemonic coalition of organizations, 
a loose movement, which put forward a range of ‘blended’ alternative visions 
and represented the NO vote. What the NO social movement sought to do 
was to wrest back the right to define political participation and its end-goals 
from the government and public authorities. To influence citizens’ voting 
decisions, the NO campaign went beyond the issue of CAFTA, and challenged 
dominant, media-disseminated interpretations of reality in Costa Rica.  In other 
words, whilst also seeking to inform public opinion as to what CAFTA was 
‘really’ about, the NO campaign also sought to pose questions about what kind 
of society Costa Ricans wanted. This question extended far beyond CAFTA 
and its likely impact (Alvarez, Dagnino, Escobar et al, 1998; Escobar, 1992). 
The NO movement treated CAFTA as not just another set of economic 
and trade policies, but as the Trojan Horse of the neo-liberal system. It was 
repeated that unfettered competitive capitalism would undermine Costa 
Ricans’ capacity to make choices about their own futures as well as their ability 
to protect their society from rising inequalities and resultant social tensions.  
CAFTA’s neo-liberalism was linked to complicit local economic and political 
elites who – it was implied – were betraying the nation. The NO movement 
rejected the exclusionary and unequal society CAFTA promised to reinforce. It 
wanted instead recognition that diverse voices and identities needed to be 
accommodated within a framework of equal and active citizens. For the NO 
movement, collective action implied the exercise of political participation with 
a strong cultural dimension. As Dagnino (2005) states in relation to other 
examples of citizen action, participation for many Latin American social 
movements is informed by notions of active and inclusive citizenship and: 
…transcends a central reference in the liberal concept, the claim to access, 
inclusion, membership and belonging to an already given political system.  What 
is at stake, in fact, is the right to participate in the very definition of that system, to define 
what we want to be members of, that is to say, the invention of a new society  
(emphasis in original, Dagnino, 1998:51). 
At the core of the NO movement’s political practices were a set of claims 
related to the right to voice thoughts, feelings and opinions. As we saw in 
Section 4, communicating ideas and experiences, and having access to means 
of sharing such information, were core claims of the NO movement. These 
claims reflected the belief that to engage in political participation in democratic 
ways, there needs to be available relatively clearly, cheaply and freely not only 
information for citizens but also information by citizens. Trivia and gossip 
provide only misinformation, and meant that many Costa Ricans were left 
feeling confused and unable to ‘do anything’ about Costa Rica’s growing social 
and economic problems.  
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With time, the NO movement’s own networks (local Patriotic Committee-
based groups, web and internet communications and lists) started to replace 
mainstream media and official sources of information for many NO 
movement members.  As this happened, a significant part of the general public 
started to express their support for a NO vote. Even with the best will in the 
world, networked politics cannot easily overcome the hegemony of mass media 
communications, with their reach and resources.  Democratic and creative the 
alternative sources of information may have been, but TV’s reach was wider 
(Wainwright, Reyes et al, 2007: 39). Keeping people in the dark silences debate, 
or in Bauman’s memorable phrase: “a rope plaited of ignorance and inaction 
comes in handy whenever the voice of democracy is to be stifled or have its 
hands tied” (Bauman, 2005: 126). This is why the right to information proved 
such an important part of the NO campaign’s claiming and exercising of rights 
in relation to political participation. The direct participatory processes engaged 
in almost managed to turn a majority of those who voted into NO supporters. 
Almost, but not quite. 
In relation to social movements’ theory, this study has tended to confirm 
the views of those who see significant points of convergence between those 
who stress resources and those who explain social movement activities and 
membership in terms of non-material, value-based goals. There is no logical 
contradiction here, and this point is echoed historically speaking in the work of 
Colhoun, who has shown how early social movements made both identity 
claims and material rights claims at the same time (Tilly, 2004: 71). The point 
here is that social movements’ political participation rights claims are often 
constructed in ways that simultaneously articulate with economic, social and 
cultural demands. Sometimes, globalization allows common understandings 
that produce what Olesen (2002) calls a ‘shared injustice frame’ to emerge 
among very diverse movement members. To some extent, this was true of the 
NO movement too. Such shared understandings of what the problem was 
were very important in how those involved in the NO movement in Costa 
Rica came to understand their own actions and the aims for which they were 
working together.  This shared frame of reference can also be international, 
and for the case we are analyzing, this means that actors in the NO movement 
in Costa Rica may – perhaps without realizing it – increasingly be taking their 
cues from wider regional examples of resistance outside the country (Olesen, 
2005; Tucker, 2006; Icaza Garza, 2004).  At the same time this study challenges 
the idea that states have dissolved in the past twenty years or so, and we tend 
to agree with Charles Tilly that: ‘states remain salient actors, targets and sites of 
early-twenty-first-century social movements’ (Tilly, 2004: 108), even if other 
actors like media and national and transnational private corporations are also 
key players today. 
The NO movement, like most ‘new’ social movements, is connected 
transnationally with movements in other countries, and is involved in global, 
national and local alliances and networks all at the same time.  Yet these 
connections come as much from working with rights issues locally, in a 
grounded way, as from any universal rights-frame of reference (Sassen, 2004). 
These transnational and local aspects of the NO movement were not explored 
in detail in this paper, which has stuck to the more realistic goal of trying to 
understand the movement during the Referendum, and within Costa Rica.  We 
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have focused on how members claimed and exercised political participation 
rights by focusing more or less exclusively on the mobilization process around 
the NO vote in the CAFTA Referendum of 2007.   
The NO movement spent energy publicly denouncing the lack of 
legitimacy of the political and economic elites, of the system they already 
represented, and of the economic project they would bring in if CAFTA were 
introduced. The main beneficiaries were elites and foreign companies. The NO 
movement sought to protect the gains of the past in terms of defending the 
Costa Rican model of ‘balanced’ and relatively inclusive social and economic 
development.  Basic human securities and entitlements were seen as better 
than rampant market competition, from the NO movement’s point of view. 
This helps explains why the NO movement took such a ‘nationalist’ line in its 
overall arguments, and perhaps also why a widespread tendency for social 
justice movements to be internationalized was less noticeable in the case of the 
Costa Rican anti-CAFTA and NO movement (Tilly, 2004: 113-121).  
6.2 Linking rights, democracy and development 
Rights-based claims regarding political participation have been the main focus 
of this study. Over and above this theme, there has been a second strand of 
interest in how the NO movement has helped to expand notions of what 
democratic politics looks like. The idea here is that there is a ‘master frame’ (or 
widely accepted idea) of democracy that has helped to legitimize the 
movements’ claims and actions during the struggle against CAFTA (Lekhi & 
Newell, 2006; Olesen, 2002, 2004).  Both by organizing and debating, the NO 
movement fostered popular forms of political power that could have a longer-
term impact, and prove useful antidote to the neoliberal insistence on market 
competition and the inevitability of CAFTA. Other development models were 
set on the table – and placed on the menu – and arguably this remains 
important even after the Referendum is over (the longer-term consequences 
are not yet clear).     
Through their messages and organizational practices, the NO movement 
and those in it, also questioned traditional neo-liberal and institutionalized 
interpretation of democracy and rights. Notably, they identified and 
communicated to the public the powerful nexus between socio-economic 
development, human rights and politics. In drawing these connections, the 
movement was able to highlight how decisions about CAFTA membership, 
presented by the government as purely ‘economic’, ‘legal’ or ‘technical’, were 
much more far-reaching, being political, cultural and environmental in their 
implications. The way the NO campaign was conducted brought to light that 
implementation of the neoliberal CAFTA-based model of development, would 
result in democratic institutions being manipulated even more than before, for 
the economic benefit of elites and for transnational interests.   
Existing crises of political representation and corruption inside Costa Rica 
were associated with the notion that the pro-CAFTA political leaders 
prioritized their own class interests over even the most basic rights of the 
majority of ordinary Costa Rica’s citizens, especially women, the poor and 
other marginalized groups. The NO campaign and vote was presented as a way 
to ‘reclaim’, or recapture the state and its institutions from those corrupt elites, 
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who lacked legitimacy. By voting NO, citizens could help ensure that the state 
once again served the citizens, and not the other way round (Wainwright, 
2003). In this way, the NO movement and its participants promoted the idea 
that ordinary citizens could and did have the right not only to know about the 
issues, but also to hold institutional representatives and political leaders 
accountable for decisions taken on their behalf. The notion that democratic 
politics can be constructed purely on the basis of self-interest and a periodic 
vote was more or less dismantled by the movement.  CAFTA membership was 
not the only issue, but the way in which participants were not being enabled to 
understand the information or to critically assess the implications of CAFTA 
being introduced, was seen as inexcusable.  
The NO movement’s vision of rights was that political rights and social 
justice were interdependent with economic justice. The particular history of 
Costa Rica meant that ‘democratic’ political achievements were viewed as 
inseparable from the historical context construction of a social and welfare 
state (Estado Social de Derecho). This history framed the NO movement’s entire 
struggle to define how democracy should be understood. An essential part of 
the ‘Costa Rican national identity’ emphasized by the NO movement was the 
capacity of the state to guarantee protection of citizen’s rights over purely 
commercial interests. This state model was defended even though it had 
already been undermined and weakened by the time resistance to CAFTA was 
being mobilised.  Voting NO became a patriotic exercise of citizenship in 
order to defend basic welfare and economic rights; no more and no less. 
A concern with democratizing political life, the state and national 
development plans, was accompanied by a concern to democratize social 
relations and modes of communication. Politics was defined broadly by the 
NO movement to include relations between the state and civil society and 
within the private and personal spheres at household and community levels.  
The need to loosen the grip of vertical and exclusionary patterns of 
domination, which tended to isolate those at the ‘bottom’ of society, has been 
considered crucial inside the movement. So too was building up collective 
power from among citizens to help them shape improved possibilities for 
active citizenship in future, which were considered the most basic elements for 
a real or ‘substantive’ democracy (Dagnino, 2005; Escobar, 1992; Olesen, 
2002).  The idea of ‘radical democracy’ of de Souza may also prove helpful in 
this context (De Souza Santos, 2006; Olesen, 2002, 2005; Smith et al, 2008) 
6.3 Political participation claims: democratic discourses & 
practices 
This study drew a distinction between ‘claiming’ and ‘exercising’ rights. In 
practice, this tidy analytical distinction does not translate into separable 
activities of social actors. To be able to demand improved accountability from 
public authorities and specific institutions through formal and existing 
mechanisms, one may also need to be able to exert pressure by acting to create 
spaces for autonomous organization and for generating media debates so that 
rights can be realized without the need to assert state accountability. The 
question is not really one of principle, but of the art of the possible; in other 
words, this is a question of strategy rather than ideology. 
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Indeed the claiming and exercising distinction is not really a choice; both 
are ways of reaching a goal of realizing rights. They can be combined, and 
perhaps they should be. They were certainly combined by the NO movement 
in Costa Rica. Exercising rights through collective action can create new spaces 
and new ways of claiming rights through holding the state and other actors 
accountable. Thus, as this study has shown, the NO movement was able to 
pursue formal efforts to claim rights from the state authorities, including 
through regional human rights instruments, whilst at the same time NO 
movement members undertook new initiatives that opened up possibilities for 
rights-promoting and fulfilling actions by citizens themselves. Exercising 
agency, and combining formal and informal mechanisms, are the key 
‘deductive’ and ‘inductive’ elements in this process of realizing rights (de Gaay 
Fortman, 2006). 
6.3.1 Connecting formal and informal claims 
Formal processes of claiming rights focused mainly on institutional, and 
especially legal, national and regional mechanisms, including constitutional 
provisions.  Through these instruments, the NO movement tried to hold the 
government, and other potential violators of rights, such as the media and 
other private corporations, accountable for protecting basic rights. Basically the 
claims made by the NO movement sought to guarantee conditions for ‘fair’ 
campaigning around the CAFTA Referendum. Through making such claims 
the movement demanded institutional action to reduce abuses of power by the 
central political authorities and their allies, including by private corporations in 
control of the mainstream media, where unequal access was a particular 
concern, which the NO movement claimed undermined the political rights of 
citizens, as voters, especially to have clear information. NO supporters were 
deprived of the representation of their views on mainstream TV and in 
newspapers. The movement demanded recognition of this problem, and called 
for greater media regulation to protect the rights of the citizens to be fully 
informed and on this basis to participate freely in the Referendum process. 
Some NO movement participants used institutional mechanisms and 
resources and adopted these formal, legal procedures to frame their demands.  
But research in the field suggested that most participants in the NO movement 
tended to be focused on daily actions of building movement spaces, often in 
experimental ways. Their main concerns were to devise creative strategies for 
exercising their own rights to political participation in particular. From the 
interviews, these initiatives and spaces of action around the NO movement 
were also felt to be closer to people’s own experience and more under their 
control (McDonald, 2006).  Formal legal strategies were mainly of interest to 
those elites whose participation was facilitated by their ‘resources, expertise and 
influence’ (Lekhi & Newell, 2006:197).  Moreover, legal claims were made to 
institutions not widely trusted and generally viewed as not that representative 
in terms of people’s participation and the priorities of the NO movement.  On 
the whole, formal and informal claims tended to reinforce one other.  
It is interesting that NO movement participants, even in relation to 
conventional legally-based claims, looked very critically at the law. They 
demanded modifications in its provisions, and accused the state authorities of 
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not meeting their legal obligations to protect and fulfil the basic rights of 
citizens, including to information.  The claims of the NO movement sought to 
show that the power and discretion of corporations, including the media, 
should be closely regulated (Benedek, 2003; Fisher & Harms, 1983). By 
contextualizing their legal claims, participants in the NO movement tried to 
demonstrate how elite self-interest distorted, and undermined formally 
democratic legal and political processes. The principle of neutrality became 
irrelevant in a context where the government and big business were openly 
promoting the YES to CAFTA position. Moreover, the consideration of the 
means of communication as important duty bearers with social responsibilities 
regarding rights to political participation was stressed although eventually the 
existing formal mechanisms did not enable the respect of these rights to be 
enforced. The absence of real information and debate was presented by the 
NO movement as a violation of citizens’ basic right to information and 
political participation.  
Conflicts and tensions inside the NO movement among positions that 
prioritized legal and institutional strategies and those who preferred informal 
strategies like mobilization, activism and processes of organization, distribution 
of information and reflection in communities, were perceived by some 
interviewees. These can be viewed as a normal part of all social movements, 
and can be something movements learn to live with, and even learn from. 
Elsewhere, social movements have consciously combined these strategies to 
good effect, pursuing multiple-track approaches to social change (De Souza 
Santos, 2006; Lekhi & Newell, 2006; Smith et al, 2008). Appealing to 
overarching notions of democracy, which includes both the aspects of formal 
state accountability and of engaged, active citizenship, has helped the NO 
movement in Costa Rica to stay together. This ‘twin track’ approach has also 
helped in legitimizing the movement’s pursuit of several strategies at the same 
time.  In the eyes of the Costa Rican electorate, this brought support for the 
movement and persuaded some people to vote NO. 
Law-based claims proved unsuccessful, and this valorised alternative 
strategies for opening up spaces to realize political participation rights and 
construct alternatives to the mainstream media, for example. Exercising and 
practicing rights served to challenge the ‘hegemonic power’ that was prioritized 
over ‘coercive power’, given the specific history of Costa Rica (Gramsci, 1971; 
Icaza Garza, 2004). The challenge for the NO movement was to build a base 
for exercising power through mainly non-material resources (authority, 
knowledge and creativity) as well as some material means (economic resources, 
organization and access to media). The struggle in this respect was to exercise 
communication and participation rights, and to legitimize alternative 
representations of the key issues at stake. The results of the Referendum were 
almost 50: 50, and this certainly could not have been predicted at the start. Nor 
could it have been achieved without the huge creative and political effort on 
the part of NO movement campaigners and participants. 
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6.3.2 Realizing rights: alternative democratic practices and power 
‘from below’ 
The creation of physical organizational spaces and alternative media spaces was 
very significant in building collective forms of power and overcoming the NO 
movement’s structurally disadvantaged position in relation to the state 
authorities, corporate resources and the mainstream media. These alternative, 
organized spaces allowed for the mobilization of resources and the creation of 
political capacity and experience. The social spaces constituted by the 
movement were able to generate networks of national and international 
solidarity, and to disseminate and create relevant information and stimulate 
debate. All this helped to promote shared understandings (or common frames) 
among a very diverse set of groups and participants in the NO Movement. 
Through these processes, the members of the movement played active roles in 
realizing and promoting political participation rights, in fostering processes of 
civic participation, in giving expression to alternative opinions, and to other 
forms of information and knowledge. This knowledge was either not 
represented, or was misrepresented, in the mainstream. At the same time, 
through both discourse and practice, the hegemonic ‘common sense’ view of 
the issues at stake was challenged, and the ‘anti-democratic’ nature of the pro-
CAFTA strategies and practices were revealed. 
The NO campaign thus became a vehicle for promoting more active, 
inclusive and critical forms of citizen participation.  This campaign was based 
on people’s own creativity, work, and cultural and artistic expression. Processes 
of open argumentation and debate were central in raising wider public 
awareness of central issues of rights, development and democratic politics.  
The NO Movement sought to show how democratic principles could be 
applied during the campaign, not just in theory, but also in practice.  Perhaps 
circumstances forced the movement to work in a more ‘democratic’ way, firstly 
to attract the symbolical and material resources needed to confront the 
authorities so strongly supportive CAFTA. Secondly, there was a conscious 
effort by the movement to exercise deliberative and inclusive practices in their 
own daily work and campaigning, and to critically reflect on their practices as 
they were emerging.  That is, diverse participants in the movement took 
advantage of the context of the Referendum in order to experiment and apply 
in practice democratic principles, using democratic means of decision-making. 
Practices of the NO movement’s members and institutions during the 
CAFTA campaign tended to challenge the values associated with the dominant 
neo-liberal model of development.  This model was equated with the vertical 
and ‘antidemocratic’ operation of authority, especially state and corporate 
authority.  The lack of transparency, culture of political clientelism and the 
exclusionary logic of intellectual property were seen as part and parcel of this 
model.  In contrast, inside the NO movement, significant efforts were made to 
be as inclusive as possible, and responsiveness to claims of citizenship from 
diverse interests was valued, as were the different perspectives and identities of 
members and supporters. The effect was to shape a heterogeneous and loosely 
coordinated network-based movement with important levels of autonomy for 
local bodies, local actors and organizations to pursue their goals in their own 
ways.   
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Even though they took more time and effort, more participatory and 
deliberative or reflexive approaches to taking decisions tended to be prioritized 
within the NO movement. For example, when it came to deciding how 
economic resources, collectively generated by the members and supporters, 
should be used, it was decided to invest more resources into generating 
informational material to support the Patriotic Committes, rather than spend 
more on posters, adverts and other forms of publicity.  This approach was 
considered more in line with the NO movement’s campaign and democratic 
ideology (Interwiew with Juliana).  By generating a sense of a shared collective 
interest, the movement came to understand political participation as about 
forms of solidarity rather than the exchange of favours through political 
clientelism.  The strong, consistent connection observed during fieldwork, 
between the ideological meanings attached to democracy and political 
participation, for example, and the concrete political practices acted out by 
those involved in the NO movement, has also been observed in the practices 
of other Latin American social movements (Alvarez, Dagnino, Escobar et al, 
1998). Of course some contradictions and conflicts emerged, or were 
expressed, but these allowed an important part of the principle of democratic 
communication to surface, which is that differences should be aired, not 
suppressed in the name of unity.  Decision-making within the NO movement 
did appear to be consistently more democratic than in the YES campaign, 
given the lack of central command in the former. 
6.3.3 Challenging the idea of rational collective action 
Among NO participants, there were many who viewed political participation as 
something more than an instrumental, rational and self-interested set of 
practices.  As we have shown, this dominant liberal or neoliberal vision of 
political participation, has been contested across the range of NO movement 
messages and practices (Dagnino, 2005). The movement questioned the notion 
that citizens should channel their participation through existing institutional 
channels, like political parties or civil society organizations. A degree of distrust 
in existing forms of institutionalized politics was clear from both the claims 
and the ways of exercising political participation rights by members of the NO 
movement. In addition and alongside self-interest, such as the fear of losing 
jobs, services, entitlements and material rights, were ethical motivations which 
brought members of the NO movement together. These centred on social 
justice, equity and solidarity, values that underpinned claims to full political 
participation rights.  
During fieldwork, forms of ‘personalized politics’ were observed among 
NO movement actors (McDonald, 2006:88). These were visible in the 
emotional attachment and commitment of participants to the the movement’s 
struggle, and in the diversity and fluidity of the movement’s forms of creative 
and communicative expression of both ideas and practices. Political 
participation acquired a strongly expressive and emotional dimension that goes 
beyond the instrumental logic of most political campaigns. We might even 
question whether the position of all those involved in the NO movement was 
based on a cool, rational consideration of the implications of CAFTA. After all 
the agreement itself and its implementation were very complex and difficult 
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issues, difficult even for people with a university education to understand. 
More significant was a sense that those involved in the process expressed their 
discontent and anger at an increasingly unequal social order and the 
continuation of oppressive forms of vertical power relations replacing 
genuinely democratic forms of political action. These frustrations were 
experienced and felt in daily life and were associated to CAFTA. 
In this context, active citizen involvement expressed a felt need to build 
up a wider sense of a shared ‘community’, underpinned by solidarity and 
allowing for the recognition of diverse voices and priorities. In a context in 
which individualism and self-interest were seen to dominate, this vision 
represented an alternative to the mainstream associated with CAFTA. 
Moreover, political participation conceived as a process of resistance to a 
constraining dominant order, responded to the need to recover hope and some 
sense of collective power in a context of difficult economic and political 
neoliberal globalization.   
This study has reinforced the point that struggles over meanings are not 
purely semantic. Part of the real challenges to existing social structures is to 
deprive them of the ability to define what is what and set the terms of public 
policy debates. As Dagnino has shown in the case of citizens’ movements in 
Brazil (2005), redefining ideas like participation and citizenship, by departing 
from more conventional understandings of both, can be challenging to societal 
structures and political authority. She suggests that ‘progressive’ social 
movements and community-based organizations tend to stress that citizenship 
and public participation are basic rights for all people, rich and poor alike, and 
not just for the few who are well-off and highly educated. Such ‘active’, 
‘participatory’, ‘inclusive’ and ‘democratic’ forms of citizenship are forged in a 
ways that:  
…transcends a central reference in the liberal concept, the claim to access, 
inclusion, membership and belonging to an already given political system… [but 
instead]…at stake, in fact, is the right to participate in the very definition of that system, to 
define what we want to be members of, that is to say, the invention of a new society  
(Dagnino, 1998:51). 
In this sense, effective protection of people’s democratic political participation 
rights means that all voters – and not just the wealthy, well-connected people – 
should be able to protect their own interests and reflect their own perspectives 
through demanding policies and practices in line with these. Taking rights to 
political participation as an example, this requires access for people to 
understandable and reliable information. It requires the capacity to critically 
interpret such information and draw connections with broader contexts and 
the personal and subjective experiences of citizens. Problems can also arise, as 
recently noted by some other social movements, when, in newly elected 
progressive regimes in many parts of Latin America, social movements seek to 
retain their autonomy of action in the context of top-down anti-FTAs 
campaigns and policies (Zulechi, 2007: 21-2).  
One of the main democratic contributions of recent anti-CAFTA 
campaigning in Costa Rica and elsewhere can be considered its ‘popular’ and 
‘educative’ character. It was the collaborative ‘action research’ and informed, 
participatory involvement of intellectuals, formal and informal, that made it 
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possible for new forms of critical consciousness to emerge.  This exposed 
issues that might otherwise have been invisible in public debates around 
CAFTA. By generating new forms of knowledge based on recognition of 
people’s own experiences with neo-liberal policies, perspectives were opened 
up for a deeper understanding of the concerns, emotions and ideas of those 
most directly affected by such policies. An interesting aspect of the campaign 
was the creation of alliances between intellectuals and local organizations, in 
which intellectuals were at the same activists sharing their knowledge and 
learning from a diverse range of citizens, working together to influence the 
decision about CAFTA implementation. In our view, this can generate 
processes of shared communication that may also contribute to longer-term 
processes of democratization. 
The anti-CAFTA movement in Costa Rica thus developed some 
substantive alternatives to the purely limited and formal democratic political 
practices embedded in the Referendum campaign and the Costa Rican state.  
Potentially transformative forms of public participation were enacted, not for 
the first time, in media-aware ways. Citizens’ rights to political participation in 
practice were thus realized rather than existing simply on paper.  The capacity 
of people to build rights ‘from below’ was well illustrated by this case study. 
6.4 From below?  Yes but… 
The contribution of the NO movement to building more ‘democratic’ forms 
of active citizen participation needs to be critically assessed. For the most part, 
the most active participants in the movement continued to be predominantly 
middle class group of people. Those who felt themselves and their 
organizations to be in danger of future exclusion were central to the 
movement. They clearly formed the basis for political action rooted in self-
interest, where values and interests coincided. Those still ‘within the system’ 
also had more opportunities to act as vocal protagonists of the anti-CAFTA 
NO movement. They worked and moved through both virtual and physical 
spaces where they were able to express and act out alternatives to CAFTA 
scenarios. Many less articulate Costa Ricans, with fewer social and political 
connections, who were unemployed or removed from the centres of power 
and influence, were not able to access the internet, or go to meetings or attend 
campaign planning activities. In effect, they were excluded from the more open 
debates and information-sharing that characterised the movement. Their 
citizenship was constrained by this, and they were less able to realize their 
rights to political participation. Defined by various forms of marginalization by 
gender, age, class, ethnicity, rural remoteness or linguistic barriers, these groups 
were largely excluded from the NO movement’s scope and activities. Having a 
voice and influencing decisions in the process are all things that can be 
structurally denied to the poor and socially marginalized, unless some 
deliberate efforts are made to reach them and engage them in the movement. 
The NO movement generated significant efforts to tackle this problem, but 
these efforts were almost certainly not enough. The inequalities and power 
structures contained in the social structure were thus reflected within the anti-
CAFTA movement and in the NO campaign. 
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By the same token, and despite the structural exclusions that limited its 
scope, the richness of the NO movement lay precisely in its inner diversity and 
the sheer range and depth of new and old alliances and networks formed by 
the movement at multiple levels. This diversity sometimes made it difficult to 
generate attainable, agreed upon proposals for action and get beyond the 
defensive character of the anti-CAFTA position. This problem was reinforced 
because so much of the participants’ energies were expended to protect the 
already weakened social institutions of the Costa Rican state. Energy also had 
to be expended in defending themselves from attempts to criminalise and 
discredit the NO position and its supporters. Participants referred to the 
history of conflicts among some of the organizations involved in the NO 
campaign.  Some traditional vertical, self-interested styles of leadership and the 
mentalities associated with political party cliques found themselves reproduced 
within the NO movement.  Some personal practices of manipulative leadership 
were also recognized by others in the NO movement as a problem, and 
another internal limitation on the movement’s capacity to mobilize and inspire 
the majority of the electorate and so win the Referendum.   
Building more sustainable processes of organization and critically 
reflecting on the lessons of the recent past is now an important challenge for 
the anti-CAFTA movement in Costa Rica, as well as elsewhere in the region. 
By making the right to information, to expression and to active citizen 
participation in the political process, central issues in the campaign, the NO 
movement helped ensure that future mobilizations would operate in a way that 
would be more critical of the role of media, and more communicatively 
sophisticated.   
One challenge will be to overcome the culture of immediacy and prevent 
the demobilization that follows specific events-driven campaigns like the NO 
campaign.  Overcoming fatalistic visions that ensure that change is not possible 
due to the crushing power structure, was and continues to be a challenge for 
the NO Movement.  The achievements of those involved in the NO campaign 
were considerable; they managed to become a credible challenge for those in 
authority who thought CAFTA was inevitable.  There was increasing support 
for the NO vote throughout the Referendum campaign and the very even 
results of the final vote are evidence of the campaign’s impact.  However, the 
fatalistic message that led to the YES vote having an advantage over the NO 
vote, led to further loss of hope after losing the Referendum.    
7 CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
This research has explored some ways in which the NO movement against 
CAFTA sought to realize political participation rights in the context of a 
Referendum campaign in Costa Rica in 2007. The study considered how such 
rights were both claimed and exercised by those in the NO movement.  We 
also suggested the NO movement introduced more democratic understandings 
and practices of political participation in the Costa Rican context. 
The approach we adopted to rights highlights how political and ideological 
aspects of rights realization are as important as material concerns. Drawing on 
theories of social movements, and approaches to participation and rights-based 
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approaches to development, the original study on which this working paper is 
based, explored notions of political participation as potentially widening 
citizens’ agency by involving people in the public sphere in ways that more 
directly influence decision-making. The introduction of CAFTA in Costa Rica 
was undoubtedly considered, both by supporters and opponents, a decision 
that would affect the lives of everybody in the country, and generated a 
significant degree of mobilization and ideological confrontation.  We explored 
just one side of this, in the shape of the NO movement.  
Participation was understood in this research as the key to active 
citizenship. The intimate connection between participation as a right and 
participation as a process that entails people in building and defending wider 
shared notions of rights was highlighted as important to a process of political 
contestation. In the light of this, social movements can be considered 
protagonists of political participation, as well as political and cultural change 
agents, since their collective action involves struggles to portray alternative 
world visions as well as to influence the distribution of resources.  This was 
clear during the CAFTA Referendum campaign in Costa Rica. A significant 
struggle was over several different meanings of development, of democracy, 
and of participation and rights. In the case of global justice movements, of 
which we argue the anti-CAFTA movement forms a part, the struggles imply 
questioning the dominant world vision. This has become a shared ‘injustice 
frame’ for many global social movement actors (George, 2004; Olesen, 2002). 
Political participation rights are deliberately conceived broadly in this study, so 
that rights related to freedom of expression and opinion, communication and 
voice, information and knowledge, are included alongside not only the right to 
vote and be elected, but also alongside economic and social rights, such as 
education, basic services, health and so on. 
The experience of the NO movement used a broad and ‘deep’ notion of 
democracy to frame and legitimize their claims to political participation rights 
and the struggle against CAFTA. The NO campaign sought legitimacy by 
portraying itself as part of a much longer history of defending a national model 
of state-society relations rooted in solidarity, and now viewed as threatened 
and already weakened by previous implementation of neoliberal reforms. The 
distinctiveness of the Costa Rican ‘model’ may help explain why the 
nationalism of the anti-CAFTA movement was so central to the NO 
movement in Costa Rica in particular.   
As Evelina Dagnino (2008) reminded us recently, all projects are political, 
however economically realist or technocratic their presentation. This too was 
the vision and insight of the NO movement in Costa Rica. According to their 
messages democracy implies actions that protect both the values and interests 
of citizens, and especially the most vulnerable among them. From their vision 
and practice, democracy also entails active involving of citizens in demanding 
accountability from their political representatives and institutions, as well as 
helping to bring about a model of state and development geared towards 
securing everyone’s basic economic, social and cultural rights. The fulfilment 
of political participation rights is then consider a pre-condition for the citizens 
in order to actively protect and promote other sets of rights.  
  75
The anti-CAFTA movement in Costa Rica is manifestly part of the global 
justice movement, and shares some common understandings of neo-liberalism 
that characterise that movement.  The link between national and global level 
movements was not always obvious, however and it was not always clear or 
visible to the movements’ activists.  Rather their shared take on democracy 
centred on opposition to unequal, vertical and authoritarian power relations 
that shape the state’s relations with citizens, and permeate all spheres of social, 
cultural and economic life, including spheres traditionally associated with 
personal life.  The NO movement’s activists tried to make rights real through 
formal and informal claims and practices. By first demanding institutional 
accountability for the protection of rights, and at the same time relying on their 
own participants’ efforts to open up and protect spaces for collective action, 
the movement defended its own members’ and supporters’ rights, but also 
promoted wider critical awareness and sought to promote the interests of the 
general citizenry. The partiality of the government was highlighted, as were the 
biases of the corporate media. The lack of effective regulation to protect the 
rights of citizens to fair elections was revealed for all to see. Since this situation 
diminished the credibility of formal democratic institutions, it reinforced the 
appeal of more meaningful and substantive bottom-up and citizen-generated 
ideas and practices of political participation.   
In terms of rights this study has emphasized the social and cultural 
construction of rights realization. The experience of the NO movement in the 
run up to 2007 Referendum, shows how even in the absence of effective legal 
regulations to protect people’s rights, people can built them up and make them 
effective ‘from below’. This crucial dimension of the realization of rights, has 
not been sufficiently appreciated in much mainstream human rights literature 
and theory, which in our view tends to place too much emphasis on the formal 
institutions and regulations that relate to rights, and human rights.  
What emerged clearly from the case study was the widespread and 
generalized distrust in conventional institutional mechanisms of the Costa 
Rican state among a large part of the electorate. This distrust did not reflect a 
loss of interest in democratic forms of politics by the citizens involved; on the 
contrary.  It involved new and movement-based practices of political power 
which were made visible during the campaign around CAFTA membership, 
and through inspiring new members in the anti-CAFTA movement to become 
engaged themselves in more democratic forms of decision-making and 
communication.  What this study highlighted was the need to express 
emotionality rationally and creatively, the discontent with oppressive and 
unequal socio, economic and cultural order, and the need to build certain levels 
of citizen’s control and influence in decisions that shape the collective life. 
CAFTA became a symbol that brought together wider currents of discontent 
and created a good opportunity to canalize this discontent collectively and 
constructively.  It also helped to open up a public debate about the kind of 
country and development that Costa Ricans wanted. Using this discontent 
creatively, was one of the key qualities of the NO campaign, which became a 
formidable force, and secured almost 50 per cent of the vote, in spite of much 
fewer resources and publicity outlets.  The campaign was inhabited by constant 
discussions and efforts to deepen its democratic practices at every level, from 
Patriotic Committees to the regional and national levels. Such debates took 
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place through all possible means, including virtual and face to face, mediatic 
and direct forms of communication.   
To conclude, it is fair to say that the NO campaign itself represented an 
effective collective effort to demand and exercise rights in Costa Rica, 
including political participation rights as central. NO movement participants 
claimed rights through formal processes, whilst also actively building up 
physical organizations and virtual spaces, in parallel to the mainstream media. 
They did this both by mobilizing resources for the referendum and by 
generating debate and coming up with alternative visions and common 
understandings about what kind of state and society people wanted to see in 
Costa Rica, and why and how CAFTA would not contribute to this. The 
movement, through its campaigning, applied participatory democratic 
principles, and challenged narrow definitions of democracy and participation as 
used by the mainstream. Through their messages and practices, movement 
participants challenged more exclusionary, vertical and authoritarian power 
relations and biased decision-making processes. They also challenged the 
exclusionary logic of both liberal democracy and market-based principles of 
commercialization, including the privatization of knowledge and ideas.  
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APPENDICES 
 
Annex 1 
Results of Costa Rica Referendum, 2007 
 
 
 
Source: http://www.tse.go.cr/ref/ref_def/pais.htm 
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Annex 2 
Interviews August 2007 
 
 Name Organization 
1 Ricardo Araya Participant in a Patriotic Committee 
2 Carmen Caamaño Researcher Institute of Social Research, University of 
Costa Rica (IIS-UCR) 
3 Eva Carazo Movement of Organic Agriculture (MAOCO).  Participant in 
different instances of national coordination (Coordinadora 
Nacional contra el TLC, Conversatorios, Bloque Verde) 
4 Maylin Cordero Supporter of the NO. She works in the Inter-American 
Institute of Human Rights. 
5 Alberto Cortés Participant in the Communication Operative Commission 
of the NO campaign 
6 María Eugenia Díaz Participant in a Patriotic Committee 
7 María Florez Journalist of the Newspaper Semanario Universidad.  
Researcher IIS-UCR 
8 Mirta González Professor UCR.  Member of Frente Universitario Contra el 
TLC 
9 Rodolfo González Journalist of the Newspaper El Financiero of Grupo Nación 
10 Vilma Leandro Participant in the group Costa Rica Solidaria.  Participant 
in a Patriotic Committee 
11 Juliana Martínez Consultant of trade union ANEP.  Researcher IIS-UCR.  
Collaborator in spaces of central coordination  
12 Sindy Mora Researcher IIS-UCR 
13 Ciska Raventós Researcher IIS-UCR.  Frente Universitario contra el TLC.  
Participant in a Patriotic Committee 
14 Martín Rodríguez Director of Communication of the trade union of public 
employees (ANEP).  Participant in a Patriotic Committee 
15 Casilda Sancho Member of NGO working in popular education ALFORJA 
CEP Centro de Estudios y Publicaciones Alforja.  
Participant in a Patriotic Committee 
16 Carlos Sandoval Researcher and director of IIS-UCR.  Supporter of the NO 
and activist in urban/poor communities. 
17 Manuel Solís Researcher IIS-UCR.  Participant in a Patriotic Committee 
18 Ericka Valverde Coordinator of Centro de Información y Apoyo Cantonal 
(CIAC), central instance in charge of coordinating with 
Patriotic Committees. Member of NGO. 
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Annex  3 
Radio Programmes 
 
Programme: Desayunos de Radio Universidad (Breakfasts of Radio Universidad) 
 
• Topic: Denunciations before the Inter-American Commission of Hu-
man Rights (ICHR) about the limitations to the fundamental rights of 
Costa Rican citizens in the context of the Referendum.  Guests: Juan 
José Sobrado Sánchez, Pablo Barahona.  Conductors: Olga Marta 
Sánchez and Juany Guzmán.  Broadcasting:  17 September 2007.   
 
Programme: Voces y Política (Voices and Politics) 
 
• Topic: Referendum and the Right to Information.  Guests: Heriberto 
Valverde, Raúl Sileski, Armando Vargas.  Conductors: Giselle Boza, 
Manuel Rojas.  Broadcasting: 16 May 2007. 
 
• Topic: The NO-TLC Campaign.  Guests:  Rolando Araya, Ovidio 
Agüero, Fernando Orozco, Jose Alberto Grillo, Luis Montoya.  Con-
ductors: Manuel Rojas, Giselle Boza.  Broadcasting 8 August 2007.   
 
• Topic: Use of alternative media in the referendum.  Guests: Seidy Salas, 
Gustavo Verduzco, Carolina Flores, Andrea Alvarado, Alejandro Tre-
jos.  Broadcasting 12 september 2007. 
 
• Use of traditional media in the referendum.  Guests: Carlos Sandoval, 
José Francisco Correa, Julia Ardón (no present), Giovanni Bulgarelli 
(no present).  Broadcasting 26 september 2007. 
 
Source: Radio Universidad   
http://www.radiouniversidad.ucr.ac.cr/static/index.htm 
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Annex 4 
‘The Memorandum of the Fear’ 
A summary of the YES strategy 
During field research in August 2007, there were claims about a so-called 
‘Memorandum of Fear’, a confidential document containing explicit advice to 
the President and his brother, the Ministry of the Presidency. The topic was: 
‘urgent actions to activate the YES-CAFTA campaign’ (Casas & Sánchez, 
2007). This memorandum was supposed to have been written at the end of 
July during the height of the campaign by the then Vice President and a 
Member of Parliament. It was later passed by an anonymous source to the 
small, alternative university newspaper, Semanario Universidad. The 
Memorandum was published on 6 September and news of it quickly spread 
through different electronic and physical media. The Memorandum caused 
shock-waves in Costa Rican society, assisting the NO campaign to attract new 
supporters disgusted with the tactics proposed in the Memorandum (Chacón 
& Chacón, 2007).  
The Memorandum gave advice for running the YES campaign. Among 
the main concerns expressed was the lack of confidence and credibility of 
people in the government, the lack of a clear strategy to ensure a YES vote, 
and the differences between the NO and YES campaigns. The first was 
considered an ‘amazing’ coalition and the second basically formed by the 
government and some big businesses. The Memorandum also stated: ‘The 
CAFTA campaign is becoming something that we should never have allowed: 
a fight between rich and poor, between the people and the government’.  The 
following some of its recommendations: 
  
- a massive campaign in the media.  Two main strategies were recommended: 
to show the faces and voices of working class people, and of small business 
people, and to create a fear of unemployment.  The NO campaign should be 
presented as attacking democratic institutions, and linked with foreign 
intrusion (e.g. Hugo Chávez of Venezuela or Fidel Castro of Cuba).  
 
- to print a significant amount of campaign materials, which would include 
official documents with arguments in favour of CAFTA, but would not 
explicitly ask for a YES vote, so as to evade the attentions of the TSE.  The 
Memorandum recommends discord be sown among NO campaigners.   
 
- to recess Parliament so could campaign a YES vote in communities all 
around the country.   
 
- to introduce a systematic visits of senior public officials to enterprises and 
corporations should be organised for convincing workers of the importance of 
voting for CAFTA.   
 
- to form alliances with mayors, making them responsible for coordinating the 
YES campaign in their localities and applying pressures and threats, including 
the threat of withdrawing budgetary allocations to Municipalities if the 
Referendum result was negative for the YES campaign.  
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Picture 4.1
Poster of Federation of Students of UCR 
 
 
 ‘Nobody silenced UCR: neither Arias nor TSE’   
‘Street demonstration defending the university autonomy’ 
‘Let’s defend the right to say NO’ 
Annex  5 
Opposing resolutions of Electoral Tribunal 
Defending the right to voice and knowledge 
The poster below was made by the Federation of Students of the UCR.  The 
poster invited the citizenry to take part in a public street demonstration to 
defend university autonomy and the right to ‘say NO’ (Fig 4.1).  The 
demonstration was in response to a resolution in which the TSE warned the 
public universities not to use public resources for campaigning in the context 
of the Referendum (TSE, 2007a). This resolution was used by the Union of 
Commercial Chambers (UCCAEP) and the YES alliance to effectively accuse 
the university of doing just that.  The perceived unjust action by the TSE, 
which warned the universities but did not likewise reprimand political 
authorities for abusing their power and public resources, deepened concerns 
about the institutional biases and political manipulations going on in protection 
of the elites’ interests. The cartoon shows a picture of the President who has 
the Constitutional Chamber and the symbol of justice caught in a glass case.  
The president of the TSE is depicted as a puppet, whose strings are pulled by 
the President, and this puppet is about to cut the sunflower, which is the 
symbol of the UCR and represents ‘the seeking of knowledge’.  This 
illustration is a good example of how creatively humour was used by the 
movement to denounce abuses of power and violation of citizen’s basic 
political rights. 
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Annex  6 
Denouncing dishonesty of the media, counteracting the discrediting of 
the NO: an example 
 
 
Sources: pictures posted in a NO website and 
newspaper La Nación 
 
On the left, a picture of a NO supporter carries the message ‘La Nación lies’, 
worn during a public demonstration of NO campaign supporters.  La Nación is 
a mainstream (conservative) Costa Rican newspaper which openly supported 
CAFTA. Social movements completely discredited neo-liberal policies before, 
at the time of the huge Combo ICE mobilization of 2000 (Alvarenga 
Venutolo, 2005; Marín Cañas, 2004-2005).  On the right a poster associating a 
NO vote with foreign ‘anti-democratic’ leaders. Published in La Nacion in 
August 2007.  Translated text: The NO faces: Fidel Castro, Hugo Chávez and 
Daniel Ortega.  The three of them want to destabilize our democracy and are 
behind those who support the NO for achieving that.  Our democracy is at 
risk. Let’s say YES to CAFTA! Let’s ratify our will to contine living with 
freedom and without either extremisms or totalitarianism. Yes to democracy! 
Annex 7  
Contesting political authorities through Internet 
 
 
 
